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Abstract
Social media services and applications enable billions of users to share an unprecedented
amount of social information, which is further augmented by location and collocation
information from mobile phones, and can be aggregated to provide an accurate digital
representation of the social world. This dissertation argues that extracted social knowl-
edge from this wealth of information can be embedded in the design of novel distributed,
socially-aware applications and services, consequently improving system response time,
availability and resilience to attacks, and reducing system overhead. To support this the-
sis, two research avenues are explored.
First, this dissertation presents Prometheus, a socially-aware peer-to-peer service that
collects social information from multiple sources, maintains it in a decentralized fashion
on user-contributed nodes, and exposes it to applications through an interface that imple-
ments non-trivial social inferences. The system’s socially-aware design leads to multiple
system improvements: 1) it increases service availability by allowing users to manage
their social information via socially-trusted peers, 2) it improves social inference perfor-
mance and reduces message overhead by exploiting naturally-formed social groups, and
3) it reduces the opportunity of attackers to influence application requests. These perfor-
mance improvements are assessed via simulations and a prototype deployment on a local
cluster and on a worldwide testbed (PlanetLab) under emulated application workloads.
Second, this dissertation defines the projection graph, the result of decentralizing a social
graph onto a peer-to-peer system such as Prometheus, and studies the system’s network
x
properties and how they can be used to design more efficient socially-aware distributed
applications and services. In particular: 1) it analytically formulates the relation between
centrality metrics such as degree centrality, node betweenness centrality, and edge be-
tweenness centrality in the social graph and in the emerging projection graph, 2) it ex-
perimentally demonstrates on real networks that for small groups of users mapped on
peers, there is high association of social and projection graph properties, 3) it shows how
these properties of the (dynamic) projection graph can be accurately inferred from the
properties of the (slower changing) social graph, and 4) it demonstrates with two search
application scenarios the usability of the projection graph in designing social search appli-
cations and unstructured P2P overlays.
These research results lead to the formulation of lessons applicable to the design of socially-
aware applications and distributed systems for improved application performance such
as social search, data dissemination, data placement and caching, as well as for reduced
system communication overhead and increased system resilience to attacks.
xi
Chapter 1: Introduction
The dramatic increase in the number of computing devices used by billions of people from
around the world allows individuals to share with each other their location, collocation
with others, daily schedules, personal preferences such as in dining, movies, and music,
hobbies and other social activities such as sports, games, etc., through numerous social
applications and services (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Users share a wealth of social information over a variety of social applications
and services.
Social information collected by such applications and services include declared relation-
ships (e.g., friendships on Facebook or membership in LinkedIn groups), as well as in-
ferred social relationships (e.g., users “like” the same video on YouTube or play online
games together) and location of their users. Typically, users are represented as nodes in a
social graph and are connected with each other by a social edge.
Socially-aware applications and services, by definition, exploit user relationships to pro-
vide enhanced functionality and better performance. For example, such services have
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leveraged out-of-band social relationships for filtering restaurant recommendations based
on reviews by friends (e.g., Yelp [Yel12]), recommending email recipients or filtering spam
based on previous email activity [KRS+06], exploiting social incentives for computer re-
source sharing [TCL08, LD06], improving security in social networks [YKGF06, YGKX08],
inferring trust in peer-to-peer storage systems [MRG+05], and building peer-to-peer over-
lays [PCT04] for private communication.
In addition, social relationships inferred from online social information have been used to
rank Internet search results relative to the interests of a user’s neighborhood in the social
network [GMD06], to favor socially connected users in a BitTorrent swarm [PGW+08],
and to reduce unwanted communication between users [MPDG08]. Social information has
also been leveraged in conjunction with location and collocation data to provide novel
mobile applications such as Loopt [Loo12], Foursquare [Fou12] and Latitude [Goo12a].
The common approach for building such social applications is the vertical integration,
where one source of information is used to construct a social graph of users-nodes con-
nected over application specific edges and used within the application bounds. Instead,
combining declared and interaction-based social information from multiple sources can
provide more accurate and personalized support for novel social applications covering a
wide spectrum of domains. This can be achieved through an infrastructure that absorbs
social information from an unrestricted set of domains, and can export it to an ever-
evolving collection of socially-aware applications and services [IBK12].
At the heart of this infrastructure must be a persistent social knowledge management
service, scalable with the number of users represented and the number of social sources
providing input. Such a service should support a variety of requests from social appli-
cations through a basic API. Furthermore, depending on where users store their social
information, the search workload imposed by applications can lead to socially-informed
routing of requests within the computing system supporting the service.
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This dissertation makes two main contributions. First, it presents the design and evalu-
ation of such a social knowledge service, Prometheus. Second, it proposes the projection
graph model to study the network properties that the service’s computing nodes acquire
during the mining of social information from applications.
The next two sections (Section 1.1 and 1.2) present the types of social information col-
lected by Prometheus and the system architecture used to support and manage these
social data. Section 1.3 expands on the network properties that system peers acquire
during application traversals of the user social graph. Section 1.4 presents the thesis and
extracts relevant research questions addressed through this dissertation. Section 1.5 sum-
marizes the research contributions and Section 1.6 outlines the chapter structure of this
dissertation.
1.1 Collection and Use of Social Information
Social information can be collected and managed within the context of an application,
as in the examples presented earlier, or can be exposed from platforms such as online
social networks (OSNs) (e.g., Facebook, Google+, etc.), which are specifically designed to
collect and manage social information on user’s behalf, and make it available to 3rd party
online applications and services. In such networks, however, hidden incentives for users to
have many “friends” can lead to declarations of contacts with little connection in terms
of trust, interactions, common interests, shared objectives, or other such manifestations of
real social relationships [GWH07]. For example, 90% of Facebook users perform 70% of
their interactions with only 20% of their friends [WBS+09].
Alternatively, interaction-based social information provides an unprecedented level of de-
tail compared to the binary declared relationships typical of OSNs. First, it provides the
opportunity to quantify the strength of the social relationship based on domain-specific
3
metrics, such as quantity (e.g., phone call duration or number of characters in instant
messaging exchanges) and frequency. Second, it conveys more accurate information than
declared relationships, which are generously created and rarely removed. However, there
are declared relationships that could not be removed, even if rarely supported by inter-
actions, such as family relations or long lasting ties with close friends. Thus, a social
application must wade through a lot of noise embedded in the collection of such social
information in OSNs to provide targeted functionalities.
In this work, we argue that the combination of social information from diverse applica-
tion domains can enable novel socially-aware applications. For example, a context-aware
phone-call filtering application (e.g., CallCensor [KFA+10a]) may filter calls when caller
Bob tries to reach callee Alice, based on 1) the declared professional relationship between
them in LinkedIn, 2) the personal relationship between them in Facebook, 3) the phone
call interactions between them, and 4) the current collocation of Alice with other indi-
viduals. A social knowledge service could store all these types of social information about
Bob and Alice and allow the mobile application to query for a particular type of social
edge connecting Bob and Alice within the social graph. Using this combined information,
personal calls can be automatically silenced during professional meetings, but co-workers’
or other professional-related calls are let through.
Therefore, such a social knowledge service should manage and expose to applications a
combination of declared and interaction-based information from diverse social sources, as
well as location and collocation information. This wealth of information can 1) lead to a
more accurate inference of trust and incentives for resource sharing [KFA+10a, IBK12],
2) help identify social contexts, e.g., for geo-socially-aware data sharing when in a per-
sonal vs. professional context [KFIB09], and 3) enable novel classes of social applica-
tions [AKFI10, KFA+10a, IBK12].
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1.2 Management of Social Information
The graph constructed from the social knowledge service could be stored and managed by
a wide range of system architectures, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Decentralization of users’ social information in different system architectures.
A mobile device can typically hold only the user-owner’s social circle. Centralized com-
pany servers have access to all users’ social data. A P2P network node holds information
about a small subset of users.
On one side of the spectrum, the social graph could be stored in a centralized way on
company servers, and exposed to services and applications via APIs. However, the busi-
ness model of a centrally administrated architecture (e.g., Facebook, Google, etc.) is typ-
ically based on selling users’ data to 3rd party companies for advertising [NM09, Con12,
Gun11]. Therefore, there are no incentives or appropriate business models to store social
data for free and, at the same time, respect user privacy and allow users full control over
their data. Additionally, users must trust their provider for complying with privacy and
availability policies and not practicing “Big Brother” monitoring, which is especially im-
portant when it comes to aggregated collection of social information [Nis04, BDMN06].
Furthermore, some OSNs institute particularly draconian policies concerning the own-
ership of user-contributed information and content. For example, users cannot easily
delete their OSN profiles (e.g., from Facebook servers); they cannot export their social
data to a service of their choice in a transparent and easy way (e.g., from Facebook to
5
Google+); and the use of social information is restricted by the functionalities offered
within the OSN that manages it. In summary, current OSN users depend on information
collected and exposed by centralized OSNs and have to trade privacy and ownership of
their data, as well as transparency in usage of their data by 3rd-party companies, for
service availability and functionality.
On the other side of the spectrum, as shown in Figure 1.2, the users’ social data could be
managed by the users’ mobile devices in a fully decentralized fashion [MMC09, POL+09,
SRA10, TPI11]. Much of the social information is nowadays generated by mobile devices.
However, they are inherently unsuitable for running a complex social service that com-
bines social information from multiple sources, performs multi-hop inferences on multiple
users’ social data (not just the device’s owner) and exposes these inferences to applica-
tions and services of many users. This is due to resource constraints: the mobile devices
may not be always online or synchronized to support up-to-date inferences; and computa-
tional resources, and more importantly energy, are likely to be scarce.
In between these two extremes, there is a wide range of distributed solutions where groups
of users have their social information stored on the same machine. Of the various dis-
tributed architectures, the peer-to-peer (P2P) architectural approach [BSVD09, SVCC09,
CMS09, AR12, GGS+11, KFA+10a] has significant benefits over centralized systems and
mobile devices. In the P2P approach, the social graph is divided into subgraphs and stored
and maintained by the P2P system in a decentralized fashion across the user-contributed
peers. Therefore, a social knowledge service that uses a P2P architecture can: 1) elim-
inate single points of failure and provide better user control over privacy of social data
compared to centralized systems (e.g., Facebook) and, 2) provide better service availabil-
ity and functionality for social applications mining the social graph than mobile devices.
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1.3 System Traversal of Social Graphs
Regardless of the type of system architecture, the computing nodes (company servers,
peers or phones) are “connected” with each other because of the social ties connecting the
users-owners of the social data stored on each node.
When an application submits requests in the system to traverse the social graph, the re-
quests will be forwarded between computing nodes in a manner informed by the way the
graph is divided and stored in these nodes. In particular, the routing of requests between
nodes can follow the social edges connecting users over multiple social hops. To study
the properties of this socially-informed routing we use projection graphs. In these graphs,
computing nodes are connected if users storing their data on different nodes are directly
connected in the social graph.
Furthermore, during request routing, system nodes acquire particular network centrality
properties because of the users’ position in the social graph, and could be forced to serve
a high (or low) load of requests. These load imbalances could be significant for centralized
systems, but especially for decentralized systems such as P2P networks, where peers are
typically less resourceful than company servers, are interconnected over high delay net-
work connections and exhibit higher churn.
Consequently, studying the projection graph and the centrality properties of the P2P sys-
tem that supports a social knowledge service such as Prometheus can reveal opportunities
to inform the service’s design for better data caching, data replication, or system load
balancing. Furthermore, these properties can be used to inform the design of applications
using the social graph, thus improving overall application and system performance.
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1.4 Thesis and Research Questions
In general, a social knowledge service should: 1) be able to store and manage social infor-
mation from multiple sources in the form of declared and interaction-based social edges,
2) distribute this aggregated information on a P2P system instead of a mobile-based or
centralized system, for better user-controlled privacy, service availability and functional-
ity, and 3) expose this aggregated information via an inference API, thus enabling novel
socially-aware applications and services.
Furthermore, the decentralization of the service’s social graph on multiple peers can in-
fluence the routing of queries in the system. Hence, studying the network centrality prop-
erties acquired by particular peers can reveal opportunities to inform the design and im-
prove the performance of the social knowledge service and other socially-aware distributed
applications and services.
These observations on the collection and management of social information via a social
knowledge service, and the use of social information from applications and services lead
to this dissertation’s thesis:
Embedding social information in the design of a distributed social data management sys-
tem leads to improved service availability and query response time, reduced system over-
head and increased resilience to attacks.
This thesis raises a number of research questions which motivate the work presented in
this dissertation:
• How can the system store and manage users’ social data, collected from mul-
tiple sources, in a decentralized fashion?
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• How can the system process social graph information on behalf of social ap-
plication and service requests, while offering users privacy and access control
to their data?
• How can the system take advantage of social knowledge from the user graph
to enhance service scalability, availability and inference functionality?
• How does the topology of the decentralized social graph affect the routing of
application queries in a social knowledge service?
• How does the degree of social data decentralization affect the network proper-
ties of nodes in such a service?
• How can a system or application designer use these node network properties
to inform the design, and thus improve the performance, of distributed appli-
cations and systems?
1.5 Research Contributions
The research approach we followed to support this thesis can be grouped into two main
parts. First, we designed, implemented and evaluated Prometheus, a large-scale distributed
system for social data management. Our work on Prometheus resulted in the abstraction
of several network properties that are applicable to many similar systems. This abstrac-
tion led to the projection graph, a generalized model of these distributed systems. Within
this second part, we defined a model for the projection graph, an evaluation of its net-
work properties and how they can be used to design more socially-aware applications
and P2P overlay systems. The research contributions of this dissertation are described
in more detail in the next paragraphs.
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First, we design Prometheus [KFA+10a], a socially-aware P2P service, that manages user
social information and exposes it to applications and services through an interface that
implements non-trivial social inferences. This service collects social information from
actual interactions between users within multiple environments (e.g., OSNs, email, mobile
phones), and stores it on user-selected peers. Thus, it maintains richer and more nu-
anced social information than current OSNs, which can lead to more accurate inferences
of trust, interests, and context. Prometheus represents social information as a directed,
weighted and labeled social multi-graph distributed on a P2P network comprised of user-
contributed peers. Access to social data by applications is controlled by user-defined poli-
cies.
Second, we demonstrate that Prometheus’ socially-aware design increases service avail-
ability, improves social inference execution performance and enhances resilience to at-
tacks. This is shown experimentally via simulations on real social graphs and via world-
wide large-scale experiments on hundreds of machines on the PlanetLab testbed [Pla12].
Third, we define the projection graph (PG) [KI11] emerging from the decentralization
of a social graph on a P2P system such as Prometheus, and study its network proper-
ties. We discover that within a range of social data decentralization on the P2P network,
the projection graph inherits the network structure of the social graph it projects. We
identify experimentally this range through the study of three classical network centrality
measures: i) degree centrality, ii) node betweenness centrality, and iii) edge betweenness
centrality, We investigate how these metrics in the projection graph correlate with the
metrics of the social graph, while varying the degree of social data decentralization in the
system (as seen in Figure 1.2).
Fourth, we empirically demonstrate how the projection graph centrality properties can
be used to enhance application performance. We focus on social data search and experi-
mentally show significant improvements on search success rate, as well as reduction of the
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expected system overhead during the traversal of the social graph distributed on multiple
peers.
Fifth, we empirically demonstrate how the projection graph centrality properties can be
used to reduce overlay overhead in a P2P system that stores a social graph. We focus
on unstructured P2P overlays and experimentally show how we can leverage the projec-
tion graph properties to construct an overlay that improves overall success rate in social
search as well as reduces system overhead imposed by the application search queries.
1.6 Dissertation Outline
The outline of this dissertation is described in the following paragraphs.
Chapter 2 presents the details of the Prometheus’ design. Chapter 3 examines experimen-
tally Prometheus’ performance under high-stress workloads from emulated applications
on a local 10-node cluster and on a hundred machines on PlanetLab. Furthermore, it
demonstrates the system’s usability with CallCensor, a mobile social application which
imposes real-life constraints. Chapter 4 discusses the resilience of a socially-aware system
such as Prometheus to attacks from malicious users and peers.
Chapter 5 introduces the projection graph and presents a formal model for the emerging
projection graphs in P2P systems such as Prometheus. Chapter 6 presents the analytical
relations of the three social network metrics between projection and social graphs. Chap-
ter 7 examines experimentally on real networks the association between projection and
social graphs and estimation methods for the centrality metrics. Chapter 8 demonstrates
the use of projection graph properties in the traversal of distributed social graphs at the
application level, as well as for the overlay organization of unstructured P2P networks.
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Chapter 9 presents a literature review in the main research areas covered by this disser-
tation. Chapter 10 discusses a set of lessons applicable to previous social-based P2P sys-
tems and provides guidelines for the design of future socially-aware distributed systems.
Finally, Chapter 11 concludes this dissertation with a summary of the main findings and
a discussion on future research directions.
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Chapter 2: Decentralized Social Data Management with Prometheus 1
Prometheus is a socially-aware P2P service that manages the social information of regis-
tered users in a decentralized fashion on user-contributed peers. Social information pop-
ulates the Prometheus-managed social graph via social sensors. Access to social data
is controlled by user-defined policies. This social information can be exposed to a wide
range of applications and services through an API that implements non-trivial social
inferences.
In order to better understand the functionality of the Prometheus service and how it
supports novel socially-aware applications, we first identify in Section 2.1 its role in the
social hourglass infrastructure proposed in [IBK12] In Section 2.2 we present the design
objectives of this service and in Section 2.3 we present in detail the design characteristics
that enable these functionalities.
2.1 Prometheus Overview
The social hourglass infrastructure (illustrated in Figure 2.1) consists of five main com-
ponents: social signals, social sensors, personal aggregators, social knowledge service and
social applications. Social signals are unprocessed user social information such as inter-
action logs (e.g., phone call history, emails, etc) or location and collocation information.
1Portions of this work have been previously published in [KFA+10a, IBK12] and are utilized with
permission of the publisher.
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User social sensors parse the users’ social signals, analyze them and send processed social
information to the personal aggregator of the user.
A user’s personal aggregator combines social information from the user’s sensors and
produces a personalized output based on user preferences. This is the social input of
a social knowledge service (SKS). Based on this input, the SKS builds an augmented
social graph which is decentralized on user-contributed machines. The social graph can
be mined by applications and services through an API that implements social inferences.
Prometheus fulfills the role of the SKS in the social hourglass infrastructure.
SOCIALLY-AWARE APPLICATIONS
SOCIAL SIGNALS
A1 A2 A3
S11 S21 S22 S33S32 S43
Social signals encode social data
Social sensors analyze social signals 
and quantify social relations
Personal aggregators collect, fuse, and 
personalize sensor output
Prometheus stores social data into a 
distributed social graph
Novel applications use social data to 
provide socially-aware functionalities 
CallCensorSofaSurfer
Roommate 
Finder
NETFLIX
facebook
Linked in Valve
You Tube
reddit
Bluetooth
Google
citeulike
Stored data can be accessed by 
applications through a Prometheus API
Figure 2.1: Prometheus in the social hourglass infrastructure. [IBK12]. c©2012 IEEE.
2.1.1 Social Input: Social Sensors and Personal Aggregators
Current socially-aware applications and services depend on what we refer to as social sig-
nals: information that exposes social relationships between people. A vast diversity of so-
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cial signals already exist as byproducts of Internet- or phone-mediated interactions, such
as email logs, comments on blogs, instant messaging, ratings on user-generated content,
phone call history, or via face-to-face interactions determined from (GPS or Bluetooth-
reported) collocation data. For example, a social signal could reflect the interactions of
two users A and B over a soccer video posted on YouTube by user A. These interactions
could reflect comments, “likes”, other video sharing, friendship creation, etc.
Social sensors analyze social signals of users. Sensors are applications running on behalf
of users on various platforms such as their mobile phone, pc, web browser, or trusted 3rd
party services, and transforming the domain-specific interactions for a social activity into
a weighted and labeled social edge.
Two types of social ties can typically be inferred from user interactions. The first type,
object-centric ties, are identified through the use of similar resources or participation in
common activities. Examples include tagging the same items in collaborative tagging
communities such as Delicious or CiteULike, repeatedly being part of the same BitTor-
rent swarms, as well as ties inferred from recorded collocation traces [MLF+08] or per-
sonal conversations [LBBP+11]. The second type, person-centric ties, are determined
from declared social relationships (e.g., in online social networks), or declared member-
ship to groups (e.g., networks and groups in Facebook or LinkedIn).
Many such sensors already exist, although they may not output social ties as they have
been implemented in different contexts and for different purposes. For example, these sen-
sors record and quantify user activity in online social networks [LKG+08], co-appearance
on web pages [MMH+06], or co-presence recorded as collocation via Bluetooth [EP06].
All sensors deployed on behalf of a user report social edges specific to each sensor’s do-
main to the personal aggregator of each user, with the following format:
ego : <a l t e r , l abe l , weight>
e . g . ,
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A: <B, soccer ,0.1> ( from senso r read ing YouTube s i g n a l )
A: <B, f o o t b a l l ,0.2> ( from senso r read ing NFL webs i te s i g n a l )
The personal aggregator, a trusted application typically running on a user-owned device
(laptop, desktop, mobile phone, etc), fuses multiple same activity social edges and person-
alizes information to user preference. The aggregator could perform sophisticated analysis
on these edges, such as differentiating between routine encounters with familiar strangers
and interactions between friends [EP06]. Weights can be assigned on each edge as a func-
tion of the number and frequency of interactions which allows for a more accurate repre-
sentation of the relationship strength [XNR10]. Therefore, the aggregator incorporates all
sensors’ input for the same domain, and outputs social data corresponding to labeled and
weighted directed edges for its owner and sent as input to Prometheus in the following
format:
<ego , a l t e r , l abe l , aggregated weight>
e . g . ,
<A,B, sports ,0.15>
If the labels given by the social sensors are very domain-specific, the aggregator may
apply more general labels to enhance data usability by the user’s social applications. Also
the weight can be personalized further by the user, who can prioritize sensor input based
on importance for his social applications.
2.1.2 Prometheus as a Social Knowledge Service
The SKS provides a mechanism for storing and managing user social data and exposing
them to applications and services. Prometheus, which fills-in the role of SKS in the social
hourglass infrastructure, distributes the social information on multiple peers contributed
by users and performs replication for better service availability and data durability. Fur-
thermore, access to social information is subject to user-defined access control policies.
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Figure 2.2: Prometheus input, social graph maintained, and output to applications.
Social input from aggregators is stored as a directed, labeled and weighted multi-graph.
Applications mine the graph via Prometheus API social inferences.
Figure 2.2 presents an overview of the Prometheus architecture. The information re-
ported by the users’ aggregators is processed by the service to create a weighted, directed,
labeled, and multi-edged social graph, where vertices correspond to users and edges corre-
spond to interactions between users as reported by their aggregators. The interactions are
described with a label (e.g.,“work”, “hiking”) and a weight that specifies the intensity of
the interaction.
2.1.3 Output to Applications and Services
Prometheus exposes an interface to a rich set of social inference requests computed over
the distributed social graph. For example, an application can request on its user’s behalf
to receive her top relations over a particular label. Similarly, it can request the social
strength between its user and another user not directly connected in the social graph.
Prometheus provides the mechanism by which inference requests can access not only a
single user’s social graph (i.e., directly connected users), but also the social information of
users located several hops away in the global social graph.
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All inferences are subject to user-defined access control policies enforced by the trusted
peers of the user-owner of the data. These policies allow users to have fine-grained control
over the access of all or parts of their graph by other users. For example, these policies
can specify access control as a function of social labels.
2.1.4 Prometheus in Use: SofaSurfer Application
A typical user application scenario is presented below for explaining how Prometheus is
used in the context of the social hourglass infrastructure. Let us assume that user Bob
installs a new application, SofaSurfer, that allows him to tap his social relations and
identify who in his social circle to ask for hosting while on a low-budget road trip. At
installation, the application checks with the Bob’s aggregator which of the required and
optional social sensors he is registered with. Assume that Bob has accounts on Facebook,
Skype, Google (and uses the chat utilities on all these platforms), LinkedIn, and is active
on a Team Fortress 2 (TF2) game server, and all the corresponding social signals are
observed by previously deployed social sensors running on Bob’s behalf.
These sensors consequently report Bob’s activity to Prometheus, subject to a personalized
filter stored and applied by his aggregator. For example, the instant messaging activity is
aggregated into a value recorded on Prometheus that gives more weight to Google Chat
than to Skype chat activity, the latter being mainly used for work interactions. This per-
sonalization filter can be updated rarely—due to significant changes in activity patterns
or to new social sensors deployed—or can be left to a default setting that weighs equally
all signals.
SofaSurfer will query Prometheus for a list of Bob’s social contacts that are geographi-
cally close. Consequently, Prometheus will 1) retrieve Bob’s 1-hop social neighborhood,
2) use Bob’s location to filter-out those not within his geographical proximity, and 3)
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order the remainder of contacts based on a social strength with Bob. Among contacts
can also be “friends of friends” (i.e., 2-hop social neighborhood), subject to user-specified
application-related preferences. For example, the application might allow Bob to spec-
ify that friends of friends connected via Facebook friendships are trusted enough if also
linked over direct TF2 interactions with Bob (i.e., they played together on TF2).
If not all necessary social signals are available for Bob, they will be identified when the
application is first installed. An out-of-band service lists the various implementations
of sensors and their social signals. Bob will be prompted to agree with the deployment
of missing sensors. His aggregator, as his personal assistant, provides the credentials for
these sensors (e.g., the Facebook password to access wall posts). Sensors are deployed on
where each social signal is (e.g., as a Facebook application) or on user-controlled plat-
forms (e.g., a TF2 sensor running on user’s desktop). The cognitive load on the user is
determined by the level of sophistication desired for social inferences, from default, one-
size-fits-all settings to fully personalized.
2.2 Prometheus Design Objectives
Prometheus was designed to fulfill the following system objectives:
• Extensibility: the service should be independent of the different types of so-
cial information stored.
• Accessibility: the social information should be exposed to applications and
services through an API that implements basic social inferences.
• Privacy and Access Control: users should be able to control where the social
information is stored and what is accessed by applications and services.
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• Availability: the service should be able to cope with peer churn and allow
users to control the degree of availability of their data.
• Durability: the social information should not be lost due to peer failures,
even if not always available for use.
• Scalability: the service should be scalable to thousands or even millions of
users and peers.
2.3 Prometheus Design
Pastry/DHT
Trusted Peer Group 
Management
Privacy Management
Social Graph 
Management
Scribe Past
PROMETHEUS PEER ARCHITECTURE
Figure 2.3: Overview of the Prometheus architecture. Prometheus peers organized
using Pastry, a DHT-based overlay, Scribe, a DHT multicast infrastructure, and Past,
a DHT storage system. Same color machines comprise a user’s trusted peer group
allowed to decrypt and mine the user’s social subgraph. Continuous (red) arrows show
communication for social graph and group maintenance. Prometheus inferences are
executed between peers in a decentralized fashion (dashed arrows).
The Prometheus P2P network is organized using Pastry [RD01a], a distributed hash table
(DHT)-based overlay (Figure 2.3). Prometheus uses Past [RD01b] for replicated storage
of the social data, which can be stored encrypted at any peer. A registered user creates
a group of trusted peers by selecting specific peers to manage her social data inserted by
the user’s aggregator. Only such a trusted peer selected by the owner of the social data
can decrypt the social data stored on Past. This group of trusted peers allows improved
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service availability of data decryption and processing for social inferences. The mainte-
nance of the trusted peer group is done by leveraging Scribe [CDKR02], an application-
level DHT multicast infrastructure.
Prometheus uses a public-key infrastructure (PKI) to ensure both message confidentiality
and user authentication. All users have public/private keys for both themselves and their
trusted peers accessing their social data. For access control purposes, users are identified
by their personal public keys. These keys are used by the aggregators to encrypt and
sign all data submitted to the service. Also, applications and services use them for secure
communication with Prometheus when requesting and receiving social information. In
the future we plan to enhance the security of communication between the various entities
involved in Prometheus using the Transport Layer Security protocol [TD08]. To accom-
plish the various Prometheus functionalities, each peer currently runs three components:
1) for social graph management, 2) for privacy management, and 3) for trusted group
management. Applications submit requests to mine the social graph via a distributed
interface. Answers to these requests are subject to user-specified access policies.
Prometheus’ design leverages user social relations to increase service availability and im-
prove social inference performance. In particular, social awareness is embedded in the
design of the service in two ways. First, Prometheus allows users to select trusted peers to
maintain their social subgraph based on out-of-band relationships. Socially-incentivized
users keep their computers online, thus reducing churn [TCL08, LD06] and consequently
increasing service availability for their friends’ social inference requests.
Second, socially-related users are likely to select the same trusted peers to store their
social subgraphs (i.e., friends have common friends who contribute peers in the system
and thus select the same trusted peers). This enables collocation of neighboring users’
data on the same peer(s), leading to scalability and reduced replication cost [PES+10].
Therefore, complex social inferences over several social graph hops can be fulfilled locally,
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thus reducing application response time. At the same time, user data collocation reduces
the dependability on many peers and thus reduces the opportunity of malicious peers to
influence service requests, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the next subsections we present
the design details of Prometheus.
2.3.1 Building Blocks: Pastry, Past and Scribe
Prometheus leverages Pastry-based systems as building blocks for several of its P2P func-
tionalities. Pastry [RD01a] is a scalable substrate for peer-to-peer applications, which
facilitates request routing between peers and deterministic placement and retrieval of
objects in the system. Peers participating in a Pastry-based overlay form a decentralized,
self-organizing and fault-tolerant network. Pastry is used in Prometheus to organize the
network of peers into a highly scalable DHT overlay.
When joining such an overlay, peers acquire a unique, uniform random ID from a circular
128-bit ID space (typically the cryptographic SHA-1 hash of its IP address or public key).
Application-specific messages sent between peers are represented by their own unique ID,
depending on the application specific functionality. When presented with such a message,
a Pastry peer efficiently routes it to the peer currently live and with peer ID numerically
closest to the message ID.
The expected number of steps the message is forwarded in the overlay is less than dlog2bNe
under normal operation, for a network size of N live peers (b is a configuration parameter
with typical value 4). Also, eventual delivery of the message is guaranteed, unless bl/2c
peers with adjacent IDs fail simultaneously (l is a configuration parameter with a typi-
cal value of 32). To achieve these guarantees, each peer maintains a routing table with
dlog2bNe× (2b− 1) + l entries (i.e. peer IDs pointing to particular peer IPs). For example,
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with b = 4, l = 32 and N = 108 peers, a routing table of a peer would contain on average
137 entries and the expected number of routing hops would be 7.
In order to minimize the network distance travelled by a message while being forwarded
to the closest peer ID, Pastry utilizes network proximity of peers (e.g., ping delays) to
choose the network-wise closest peer for each forwarding step. During the routing of the
message from peer to peer, the application instance of each peer which is responsible for
that type of message is notified and can perform application-specific computations or take
application-specific actions, relevant to the message received.
Past [RD01b] is a P2P scalable storage system that stores and retrieves files in a network
of peers using the Pastry DHT overlay. Prometheus uses Past to store files containing the
encrypted social data of users. In Past, a peer computes the quasi-unique file ID with a
160-bit hash of the file’s name, owner’s name or public key and a random salt, and uses
the 128 most significant bits of this ID as a Pastry message ID for the file to be stored
or retrieved. Replication within Past guarantees that the data will be available unless
all replicas are lost (or the corresponding peers fail simultaneously and unexpectedly).
Storage balancing performed in Past allows high utilization of the storage resources of
peers. In addition, caching allows faster access to popular files and load balancing on
peers.
Scribe [CDKR02], an application-level DHT multicast infrastructure is leveraged for the
maintenance of the trusted peer group of each user. Scribe allows peers to join highly
dynamic publish/subscribe groups and is implemented on top of Pastry. As mentioned
earlier, peers trusted from a user to manage her social data join her trusted peer group
and respond to inference requests from applications. In Scribe, a peer computes the mes-
sage ID (i.e., the group-topic ID), using the hash of the topic’s name. It then publishes
the message using this ID to the rest of the peers subscribed to the particular group,
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by sending it through the group multicast peer tree implemented on top of the Pastry
routing protocol.
2.3.2 User Registration
A user registers with Prometheus from a trusted device (e.g., their pc) by creating a
uniform random UID from the circular 128-bit ID space of the DHT (typically the hash
of her public key). At registration time, she specifies the peer(s) she owns (controls) and
willing to contribute to the network (if any). Through her trusted device, she creates a
mapping between UID and the list of these peers’ IP addresses and signs it with her
private key for verification. By contacting any peer in the network to momentarily join
the DHT ring, the user stores this mapping in the network as the key-value pair UID =
{IP1, ..., IPn}. When one of these peers returns from an oﬄine state, it updates the map-
ping with its current IP address.
A user selects, deploys, and configures the social sensors she wants to use via her social
aggregator (as described in [IBK12]). She may declare particular social relationships, such
as family relations, that are difficult or impossible to infer by social sensors. She compiles
a list of other Prometheus users with whom she shares strong out-of-band trust relations
and searches the DHT storage for their machine mappings (using their UIDs). From the
returned list of peers owned by these users, she selects an initial set of peers to comprise
her trusted peer group.
Selecting a large set of trusted peers increases the service availability of the particular
user. At the same time it may decrease the consistency of social data maintained across
all trusted peers of that user, and furthermore may decrease the overall system perfor-
mance due to unnecessary redundancy. As social information about a new user will be in-
corporated in the social graph, a user may be prompted with different choices for trusted
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peers (e.g., peers belonging to users with stronger ties than owners of her current trusted
peers).
2.3.3 Trusted Peer Group Management
Each user has a dedicated group of trusted peers that she can expand or contract based
on application need for availability of her data, and trust in the peers’ owners. There-
fore, three issues concerning the trusted peer group management of a user are important:
(a) group membership, (b) search for trusted peers, and (c) group churn.
A user can add peers in her trusted peer group by initiating a secure three-step hand-
shake procedure to establish a two-way trust relationship between her and the peer owner.
During this handshake process, the following steps take place: 1) the owner of the social
data sends an invitation to the owner of the peer, 2) if the peer-owner trusts the data-
owner not to be malicious, it replies with an acceptance message, 3) upon acceptance of
the invitation, the data-owner sends to the peer owner the group keys to enable the peer
to join her trusted peer group.
The group keys are transferred to the peer using an Encrypt/Sign/Encrypt process:
1) encrypting the group keys with the public key of the peer’s owner, 2) adding a plain-
text on the ciphertext referring to the peer owner and signing the whole message with
the group owner’s private key, and 3) re-encrypting all the above with the public key
of the peer’s owner. Upon receiving of the group keys, the new peer subscribes to the
Scribe trusted group of the user. The Scribe group’s handle is the concatenation of the
predefined string “Trusted Peer Group” and the user’s UID and can be used to publish
signed messages to the group using the Scribe multicast protocol.
A user may decide to remove a peer X from her trusted group, if she no longer trusts the
peer’s owner or she wants to add more stable peers in her group. To this end, the user
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creates new group keys and distributes them via unicasts to the rest of the peers that are
still trusted using the previously described Encrypt/Sign/Encrypt process. She also re-
encrypts her social data and replaces the copy in the DHT storage for future use. This
removal of the peer is multicasted to all group peers and peer X is unsubscribed from
the group. The distribution of new keys and re-encryption of the social data disallows
the newly removed peer from decrypting updated versions of the user’s social data in the
future.
A peer owner may also decide to remove her peer from a trusted group of another user
(e.g, due to overload on the peer or malicious activity from the data owner). This request
is multicasted to all the other group peers, who alert the data owner and execute the
same procedure as above. If a peer becomes untrusted while oﬄine, a trusted peer from
the group alerts the returning peer of the change and unsubscribes it from the Scribe
group.
Service requests for a user (UID) can be sent to any peer, but only the user’s trusted
peers can provide data about her. Therefore, a random peer can find a user’s trusted
peers by submitting a multicast request with handle Trusted Peer Group UID. With the
multicast, all online group trusted peers are required to respond with their IP and signed
membership, which is verified for authenticity with the user’s group public key. The ran-
dom peer creates a trusted peer list (TPL) of IPs based on peer responses.
The multicast (instead of using anycast for just one peer) allows the random peer to have
peer alternatives in case of churn or erroneous communication with the first respond-
ing peer. Since the search for trusted peers follows the DHT routing, the responds are
typically sorted in the TPL by network proximity (latency). The peer, upon creating
the TPL for a user’s group, can communicate directly with the individual trusted peers,
preferably the network-closest one (i.e., with shortest latency). Prometheus caches the
TPL after the first access and updates it when the trusted peers are unresponsive, changed
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their IP, or became untrusted. Users could also apply their own policies for refreshing the
local TPLs based on their usage patterns (e.g., daily).
The social graph for a user is unavailable if all her trusted peers leave the network; no
service requests involving this user can be answered until a trusted peer rejoins the net-
work. However, we ensure that generated data (i.e., input from social aggregators) are
not lost while a user’s group is down via storage and replication in the DHT by Past.
2.3.4 Distributed Social Graph
Prometheus represents the social graph as introduced in [AKFI10, And10]: a directed,
labeled, and weighted multi-edged graph, maintained and used in a decentralized fashion,
as presented in Figure 2.4.
Multiple edges can connect two users, and each edge is labeled with a type of social in-
teraction and assigned a weight (a real number in the range of [0, 1]) that represents the
intensity of that interaction. The labels for interactions and their associated weights are
assigned by the personal aggregator of each user. From an application point of view,
distinguishing between different types of interactions allows for better functionality. The
latest known location of a user and an associated timestamp are also maintained as an
attribute of the user’s vertex in the graph. We chose to represent the graph as directed
and weighted because of the well-accepted result in sociology that ties are usually asym-
metrically reciprocal [Wel88]. Representing edges as directed also limits the potential
effects of illegitimate graph manipulation such as spamming. We elaborate in more detail
on this issue in Chapter 4.
The social data for each user UID are stored in Past after the Encrypt/Sign/Encrypt
process is applied, i.e., encrypt with the public key of the user’s trusted group, add plain-
text referring to the group and sign with the user’s private key and re-encrypt with group’s
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Figure 2.4: An example of a social graph for eight users (A-H ) distributed on seven
peers. The top figure shows the mapping between users, peer owners, and trusted peers
(upper left corner) and how users are connected with each other over social edges, each
marked with its label and weight. The bottom figures illustrate the subgraphs maintained
by peers 1 and 5. Users in dark color (e.g., A,B,C on peer 1 ) trust the peer to manage
their social data. Users in light-shaded color (e.g., E,D on peer 1 ) do not trust the peer
but are socially connected with users who do.
public key. The data are stored in the append-only file Social Data UID as encrypted
records. Only the user’s aggregator can append records in her file and only trusted peers
can decrypt and use these records. Since the file is append-only, readers (trusted peers)
can access it at any time: in the worst case, they will miss the latest update. We designed
Prometheus to be oblivious to the number and different types of social activity reported
by the social sensors/aggregator, thus allowing extensibility.
Personal aggregators can send updates to create new edges, remove old edges, or modify
an edge weight. Each record contains a sequence number and encrypted data with the
label and its associated weight. Trusted peers periodically check the file for new records
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and retrieve all such records: this is easily done based on sequence number comparison
starting from the end of the file. The peer decrypts the new records and verifies the dig-
ital signature to make sure the updates are authentic. Then, it updates the local sub-
graph of the user with the newly retrieved records. For short periods of time, the trusted
peers may have inconsistent data, but this is not a major problem as social graphs do not
change often [Gol07].
Edges may “decay” over time if few (or no) updates for those edges are received due to
reduced number and frequency of social interactions associated with those labels [RD10].
This aging process should be activity specific, but it should also reflect the user’s so-
cial habits and interests: users who are less socially active and users with a great num-
ber of friends should have their relationships age slower. Currently, the system applies
a simple aging function to reduce an edge’s weight by 10% for every week the two users
do not interact over the particular label (thus, the connection never completely disap-
pears and the aging happens slowly). A user’s aggregator may specify a different decre-
ment value of the weight and the time period for aging (these values are also stored in the
Social Data UID file for each user).
2.3.5 Social Inference API
Prometheus exposes to applications an API of basic social inference functions that are
executed in a decentralized fashion; more complex inferences can be built on top of this
set.
The boolean function Relation Test(ego, alter, α, x) checks whether ego is directly con-
nected to alter by an edge with label α and with a minimum weight of x. A mobile phone
application can use this function, for example, to determine whether an incoming call
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is from a coworker with a strong social tie, and therefore, should be let through even on
weekends.
The function Top Relations(ego, α, n) returns the top n users in the social subgraph of
ego (ordered by decreasing weights) who are directly connected to ego by an edge with la-
bel α. An application can use this function, for example, to invite users highly connected
with ego to share content related to activity α.
Preliminary experiments (shown in [KFA+10a]) revealed volatility of the peer-to-peer
communication and long response delays during multi-hop inference execution on a world-
wide testbed. Thus, the following API functions were designed to offer better quality of
service to applications by allowing them to define, not only inference-specific parameters
(such as label and weight), but also a timeout parameter T , which declares the applica-
tion waiting time per hop.
The function Neighborhood(ego, α, x, radius, T) returns the set of users in ego’s social
neighborhood who are connected through social ties of a label α and minimum weight
of x within a number of social hops equal to radius. The radius parameter allows for a
multiple hop search in the social graph (e.g., setting radius to 2 will find ego’s friends of
friends). Our CallCensor mobile phone application which silences ego’s cell phone during
meetings at work (Section 3.5) uses this function to determine if a caller is in ego’s work
neighborhood in the social graph even if not directly connected.
The function Proximity(ego, α, x, radius, distance, timestamp, T) is an extension of the
neighborhood function which filters the results of the neighborhood inference based on
physical distance to ego. After the location information is collected for ego and the func-
tion neighborhood returns a set of users, proximity returns the set of users who are within
distance from ego and their location information is at most as old as timestamp (assum-
ing synchronized clocks with online time servers). Users who do not share their location
or have location information older than the timestamp are not returned. A mobile phone
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application might use this function to infer the list of collocated coworkers within a cer-
tain distance of ego.
The function Social Strength(ego, alter, T) returns a real number in the range of [0, 1]
that quantifies the social strength between ego and alter from ego’s perspective. The two
users can be multiple hops apart in the social graph. However, we limit the indirect path
length connecting the two users to two hops, using a well-accepted result in sociology
known as the “horizon of observability” [Fri83], where two individuals are unlikely to
have any meaningful social relationship or being aware of each other’s work if connected
over more than two social hops. The return value is normalized, as shown below, to ego’s
social ties, to ensure that the social strength is less sensitive to the social activity of the
users. Next, we elaborate in more detail on how this function is calculated on the social
multi-graph.
Assume that Λi,j is the set of labels of edges connecting users i and j and w(i, j, λ) is the
weight of an edge between users i and j over a label λ. Ji is the set of directly connected
neighbors to i. Then NW (i, j) is the overall normalized weight between two directly con-
nected users i and j:
NW (i, j) =
∑
∀λ∈Λi,j
w(i, j, λ)
max
∀j∈Ji
( ∑
∀λ∈Λi,j
w(i, j, λ)
) (2.1)
Also, assume that Pi,m is the set of different paths p ∈ Pi,m joining two indirectly con-
nected users i and m. Using the results from [Fri83], we limit the indirect paths to 2
social hops and also take into account the number of indirect paths connecting users i
and m. Then S(i,m) is the return value for social strength between users i and m, over a
multi-level 2 hop path:
31
A D C
E
NW(A,B) = 0.3 / 0.5 = 0.6
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Figure 2.5: A calculation example of the social strength inference function.
S(i,m) = 1−
∏
∀p∈Pi,m
∀j∈Ji∩Jm
(
1− min{NW (i, j), NW (j,m)}
2
)
(2.2)
In Figure 2.5 we demonstrate on a weighted, directed multi-graph the calculation of the
social strength between users A and C, over 2-hop paths. Using the normalized weights
NW between all involved users (shown below the graph), we can calculate the social
strength between A and C:
S(A,C) = 1−
{(
1− min{NW (A,B),NW (B,C)}2
)(
1− min{NW (A,E),NW (E,C)}2
)}
S(A,C) = 0.44
Such a function could be used, for example, to estimate social incentives for resource
sharing. Supported by the results and discussion in [Fri83], we expect the expression 2.2
of the social strength request to be an accurate quantification of the tie strength between
two indirectly connected users. However, more qualitative studies are needed to establish
the user-perceived quality of the function’s outcome.
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2.3.6 Access Control Policies
Users can specify access control policies (ACPs) upon registration and update them any
time thereafter. These policies, stored on each of the user’s trusted peers, are applied
each time an inference request is submitted to one of these peers to access social infor-
mation for the particular user. For availability, the policies are encrypted with the group
public key, signed with the data owner’s private key, re-encrypted with the group public
key and stored in the DHT, allowing a rejoining trusted peer to recover updated policies.
The same mechanism used for updating the social graph is used to update policies. As
future work, we plan to investigate the provision of strong consistency and conflict resolu-
tion for policies.
Currently, we consider ACPs that are comprised of two parts: (1) the social data ob-
ject(s) to be accessed and (2) the specification(s) to be met before access is granted for
the particular data object(s). They are defined as entries of the ACP UID file in the
following format:
<S o c i a l Data Object ( s)> : : <ACP S p e c i f i c a t i o n ( s)>
In Table 2.1 we present a list of access control policy definitions comprised of these two
parts.
Table 2.1: Access control policy definitions for a user in Prometheus.
Social Data Object(s) ACP Specification(s)
Social edge label α Social distance ρ
Social edge weight χ Social edge label γ
User location Λ Social edge weight y
Originator user B
Originator peer P
Intermediate user C
Intermediate peer M
Application S
Originator’s location λ
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Following is a list of social data objects for which a user UID1 (owner of the information)
can allow access to an inference request originating from user UID2:
• Social edge label α:
A policy to control access to social edges of user UID1 with other users, over
label α, regardless of the weight.
• Social edge weight χ:
A policy to control access to social edges of user UID1 with other users, that
have minimum weight χ, regardless of the label type.
• User location (Λ1, Λ2, Λ3):
A policy to control access to user UID1’s last stored location with latitude
Λ1, longitude Λ2 and altitude Λ3.
By design, ACPs are whitelists. To specify who is allowed to access these categories of
social information, user UID1 can set the following access policy specifications:
• Social distance ρ:
User UID2 must be within a maximum distance of r hops in the social graph
from user UID1.
• Social edge label γ:
User UID2 must be connected with user UID1 over a social edge of label γ
(directly or indirectly).
• Social edge weight y:
User UID2 must be connected with user UID1 over a social edge of weight y,
regardless of the label type.
• Originator user B:
The inference request must originate from user B (=UID2).
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• Originator peer P :
The inference request must originate from peer P .
• Intermediate user C:
The Inference request must be forwarded from user C (as part of a multi-hop
inference request).
• Intermediate peer M :
The inference request must be forwarded from peer M (as part of a multi-hop
inference request).
• Application S:
The inference request must come from application S.
• User location (λ1, λ2, λ3):
The inference request must originate from a user UID2 with current location
latitude λ1, longitude λ2 and altitude λ3.
Each of these access policy specifications can be placed to fulfill the requirements to ac-
cess any of the data objects stated earlier. These specifications are meant to establish
the minimum rights needed from a request to access a particular piece of social informa-
tion of the user-owner of the social data. Each of the data objects, as well as each of the
specifications, can be combined with logical operators such as AND, OR, NOT, etc, to
create more complex access policies. A default set of access policies for user Bob is shown
in Figure 2.6.
< α1 >::< B = Bob AND P = Bob
′s peer >
< α2 >::< B = Bob AND P = Bob
′s peer >
...
< αm >::< B = Bob AND P = Bob
′s peer >
< x = 0 >::< B = Bob AND P = Bob′s peer >
< Λ1,Λ2,Λ3 >::< B = Bob AND P = Bob
′s peer >
Figure 2.6: Example set of default access control policies of user Bob.
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To verify the access rights, Prometheus may call its inference functions, when applicable.
For example, to detect whether the originator of the request is within N -hops, the orig-
inator is checked against the result of a N -hop neighborhood inference. ACPs also allow
for blacklisted users (and their peers) for convenience. These users and peers are blocked
either because the owner of the social data doesn’t want to share any social information
with them, or the system has flagged them as malicious.
Figure 2.7 shows an example of the set of access control policies for user Bob. By defining
the policy for label work with the specific requirements, Bob allows work -related social
information to be given to requests coming from users within 2 social hops (i.e., friends
and friends-of-friends), that are also connected with him over work label, or when these
requests come in from the CallCensor application. Also, he allows his parents and his
brother to access his exact location at any time. However, everybody else must be in the
same approximate area with him (within a difference δ) to retrieve Bob’s location. If a
neighborhood inference request on the tango label is submitted to Bob’s trusted peer,
Prometheus checks his ACP in the order Blacklist→labels→weights. User Alice is ex-
cluded from all types of inferences and cannot receive any information about Bob.
< α = hike >::< ρ = 2 AND γ = hike AND y = 0.2 >
< α = tango >::< γ = tango OR γ = salsa >
< α = work >::< (ρ = 2 AND γ = work) OR S = CallCensor >
< α = school AND χ = 0.2 >::< (ρ = 1 AND γ = school) OR y = 0.25 OR S = CallCensor >
< χ = 0.3 >::< ρ = 1 AND S = SofaSurfer AND (C = Charles OR C = Dane OR C = Eve) >
< Λ1,Λ2 >::< λ1 = Λ1 ± δ, λ2 = Λ2 ± δ >
< Λ1,Λ2,Λ3 >::< B = mom OR B = dad OR B = brother >
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
< blacklist >::< B = Alice OR B = Gary OR C = Alice >
Figure 2.7: Example set of access control policies of user Bob in Prometheus.
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2.3.7 Decentralized Inference Function Execution
We assume that applications interacting with Prometheus cache a number of peer IP ad-
dresses to bootstrap the interaction. A social inference request for user D submitted from
B (e.g., Neighborhood(D, football, 0.2, 1 hop, 5 sec) in the social graph of Figure 2.4) can
be sent to any Prometheus peer (e.g., peer 1). The request is encrypted with D’s trusted
group public key, signed with B’s private key and re-encrypted with D’s group public key.
The receiving random peer creates D’s trusted peer list (i.e., peers 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, as
explained in 2.3.3) and forwards the request to the D’s network-closest (shortest latency)
trusted peer (e.g., peer 5), which decrypts the request, verifies the submitter’s identity
via his public key and enforces D’s access control policies for B. If the request is allowed,
the peer fulfills the request by traversing the local social subgraph for the information
requested by the application and then returns the result (i.e., users C, E and F ) to the
application using an Encrypt/Sign/Encrypt process.
For functions that can traverse the graph for multiple hops h (e.g., Neighborhood(D, foot-
ball, 0.2, 2 hops, 5 sec), the peer (peer 5) submits secondary requests for information
about other users to their trusted peers, as follows. A secondary request includes the
UID of the original submitter (B) along with the UID of the intermediary user (D) pro-
ducing the secondary request, in order for the receiving peer to verify each user’s access
rights. A time period of T ∗ (h − 1) seconds is given to the secondary peers (e.g., peer 2
for user C and peer 4 for user E, and locally at peer 5 for user F ) to respond with their
results (peers at each hop use independent clocks for T seconds). The peer submitting the
secondary requests uses the Encrypt/Sing/Encrypt process.
Each receiving secondary peer authenticates the request and checks the access control
policies for the requesting user B as well as the intermediary user D. If the request is
granted, the result is returned to the requesting peer. If the request still needs more in-
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formation, that peer (e.g., at hop k) repeats the same process and submits a secondary
request with an adjusted T ∗ (h − k − 1) timeout. Finally, the original requesting peer
recursively collects all the replies and submits the final result to the application.
Even though Prometheus contacts peers in parallel in each network hop, there can still be
variations on the communication time between peers of the same hop, leading to extended
delays. In the future, we plan to tackle this problem with the following greedy optimiza-
tion. Using the trusted peer lists of users, a peer preparing to send secondary requests for
the next hop could calculate the minimum set of secondary peers needed to cover all users
for the next hop. For the example used earlier, if peer 5 sent the secondary request to
peer 3, all users could be traversed within the same peer. This optimization can decrease
request delays by reducing the number of peers to be contacted at each hop and thus the
variability of request execution. Furthermore, the submitting peer can select not only the
minimum set of needed peers, but also the network-wise closest set of peers. Potential
conflicts between peer entries can be resolved using utility functions to model the gains
from each level of optimization.
The possible scenarios of inference execution for a request of h hops (h ∈ H = {1, 2, . . . })
are illustrated in Figure 2.8. TA defines the time for an application to send or receive a
request to a local or remote peer. TR defines the time for a request or reply to be sent
between remote peers over 1 network hop. If the application is not running on the local
peer, then we can assume that TA ' TR. If it does, then we can assume that TA ' 0.
TD defines the time for a peer to parse a request submission or reply and act accordingly
(i.e., create secondary requests or back-forward the results). We assume that TA, TR
and TD are constant and independent of the number of hops a request will traverse the
system. The overall delay given a number of network hops r (r ∈ R = {1, 2, . . . }) involved
in the execution scenario is defined as d(r), with r ≤ h. Assuming a request that traverses
the social graph for h number of social hops, F (r, h) defines the fraction of social paths of
this request that will force peers to traverse the system for r number of network hops.
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Figure 2.8: Possible scenarios of inference execution along with associated delays in the
distributed infrastructure. TA defines the time for an application to send a request or
receive a reply. TR defines the time for a request/reply to be sent between remote peers.
TD defines the time for a peer to parse a request/reply. F (r, h) defines the fraction of
social paths of a request of h social hops that force peers to traverse Prometheus for r
number of network hops. d(r) defines the overall delay for a request that needs r number
of network hops.
It would be tempting to model each inference execution scenario as a discrete-state Markov
process with each network hop being a different state in the execution process. However,
we cannot assume exponential distribution of 1) the arrival time of requests, 2) the ar-
rival time of secondary requests, 3) the departure time of replies (service time). This is
because the future state of the execution of an inference request highly depends on the
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past states and what portion of the social graph traversal was fulfilled in each of these
states. Therefore, the probability of transition from the ith state (i.e. ith network hop) to
the next state (i+ 1)th, i.e., (i+ 1)th network hop, or to the previous state (i− 1)th is not
constant and not exponentially distributed.
Using the notation of Figure 2.8, and given that the various secondary requests produced
are executed in parallel, we can define the overall execution delay, D(h), of a request of h
social hops as follows:
D(h) =
∑
r∈R
F (r, h)d(r) =
∑
r∈R
F (r, h)(2TA+ (2r + 1)TD + 2rTR) (2.3)
As mentioned earlier, an application request can enforce a timeout T for every social hop
requested. Depending on how the social graph is decentralized on peers, this timeout may
be enforced up to h − 1 times, if h = r. For example, we notice that in the third scenario
of Figure 2.8, peer 3 can lead peer 2 to a T timeout, and in the fourth scenario, peer
4 can lead peer 3 to a T timeout and peer 3 and/or peer 4 can lead peer 2 to T or 2T
timeouts. Thus, the peer that will timeout can be at hop k, with k < r. We can assume
that Q(r, k) is the probability of a request of r number of total network hops to timeout
at a particular peer at the network hop k. From the above, Q(r, k) = 0 for k ≥ r. Using
this probability, we can incorporate the timeout T in the equation 2.3 above, by adjusting
appropriately the term 2rTR as follows:
D(h) =
∑
r
F (r, h)
(
2TA+ (2r + 1)TD +B
)
, where
B =
∑
r
(∑
k
Q(r, k)((r − k)T + 2kTR) + 2rTR
(
1−
∑
k
Q(r, k)
))
(2.4)
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2.3.8 Retransmission Policy
From our experience with Prometheus when deployed on a highly dynamic system such as
PlanetLab [KFA+10a], we noticed that 10%–25% of the requests were dropped by remote
peers, due to overloaded network interfaces, reduced computing resources, etc. To tackle
this problem, we introduced in the decentralized inference execution a retransmission
policy for sending messages (requests or replies) between peers. Under this policy, a peer
can try to send a message to another peer up to three times, with each trial timing out
at 1 second. Therefore, it can take from a little over 0 and up to 3 seconds for a message
to be transmitted between two peers or permanently dropped. This policy helped reduce
the drop rate (less than 5% drops were observed in our new experiments on PlanetLab),
but also introduced an extra delay in the inference execution process. This delay forced
the request end-to-end time to vary significantly but more predictably, depending on the
number of message resends during the decentralized execution process.
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Figure 2.9: Probability distribution function of the time delay to send 2, 4 or 6 messages
between peers, when the retransmission policy is used.
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Figure 2.10: CDF of the time delay for a request with the following scenarios: (a) no
timeouts, (b) 1 timeout and 2TR (r = 2, k = 1) , (c) 1 timeout and 4TR (r = 3, k = 2)
and (d) 2 timeouts and 2TR (r = 3, k = 1), when the retransmission policy is used.
Figure 2.9 demonstrates how this delay varies probabilistically for the scenarios where a
request involves 2, 4 or 6 messages between remote peers (i.e., 2TR, 4TR or 6TR delays
from equation 2.3), under all possible combinations of these messages and the times re-
quired to be transmitted. These are the simplest cases expected in inference requests of
up to 3 social hops not including timeouts, assuming that the delays for computation and
communication with the application are negligible in comparison to the network delays,
i.e. TD << TR and TA << TR (as shown earlier in Figure 2.8 and in equation 2.3). We
notice that an increase in the number of messages involved from 2 to 4 or 6, leads to an
overall time delay normally distributed with an increasing mean from 3 to 6 or 9 seconds.
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Figure 2.10 demonstrates the execution delay when we take into account the possible
cases of timeout that could occur in the inference execution for 2 and 3 hop requests
(as described in equation 2.4 and assuming TD << TR and TA << TR) for timeout
values T = 2.5, 5.0, 7.5 and 10 seconds. We observe that the expected delay for each
scenario highly depends on the network hop that the timeout will occur (i.e., value of k
in equation 2.4) and the number of network hops of the request (i.e., value of r in equa-
tion 2.4). Overall, the expected delay of a request will be a mixture of the delays shown
in Figure 2.10, since an inference request could have different portions fulfilled in differ-
ent peers, over multiple network hops (this was declared with the fraction F (r, h)), and
with different probabilities for timeouts at each network hop (this was declared with the
probability Q(r, k)).
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Chapter 3: Performance Evaluation of Prometheus 1
In this chapter, we present the experimental evaluation of the Prometheus performance in
three different experimental setups. In the first two experiments, we deployed our pro-
totype implementation of Prometheus on PlanetLab to test the system’s performance
in a real distributed environment under the same high-stress workloads, while varying
inference request parameters such as number of social hops to be traversed, and timeout
set by the application (Section 3.4). In the third experiment, we built a weighted multi-
graph from real collocation and Facebook traces and assessed the system’s time respon-
siveness to social inference requests from a mobile application with real-time constraints
(Section 3.5).
3.1 Implementation
Prometheus was implemented on top of FreePastry [Fre12b], a Java implementation of
Pastry DHT [RD01a], which also provides API support for the functionalities of the com-
ponents Scribe [CDKR02] and Past [RD01b]. The Keyczar library [Key12] was used for
public/private key management and enforcement, as well as signing and authenticating
messages when sent between peers or between application instances and peers. Further-
more, NetworkX library [Net12] was used for the social graph management.
1Portions of this work have been previously published in [KFA+10a] and are utilized with permission
of the publisher.
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We performed various optimizations and fine tuning from our earlier work [KFA+10a]
to better handle the communication volatility and peer churn typically observed in a
distributed infrastructure, as explained in Section 2.3. We also redesigned the API as it
previously required applications and peers to exchange string-formatted messages with no
extensibility on the number of request fields. The new API allows applications to submit
a serializable class-based request using JSON [JSO12], by defining within the class object
not only inference-specific parameters (such as weight and label) but also the new time-
out parameter T , which declares the application waiting time per hop when requesting
multi-hop inferences. Furthermore, applications and peers can define parameters such as
request id and timestamp, error flags, etc. Overall, the new API design enhances exten-
sibility for future inference parameters, portability across different computing platforms,
and improves the peer-to-peer and peer-to-application communication during inference
execution.
3.2 Testbeds
The Prometheus prototype was first deployed and extensively tested on the local cluster
of the Distributed Systems Group (USF), which at the time was comprised of 10 servers
with quad-core CPUs Intel(R) Xeon(R) x3220, 2.40GHz, and 4GB RAM and intercon-
nected via a Gbit Ethernet switch. Later, the Prometheus prototyped was deployed and
evaluated on the PlanetLab (PL) testbed [Pla12].
PlanetLab is a network of more than a thousand machines with a wide range of com-
puting capabilities, contributed by more than 500 research sites around the globe, and
used for research on distributed systems and networking at a planetary-scale. Each ma-
chine runs PLC, a Linux-based operating system that supports distributed virtualization.
Different projects are allocated “slices” on the hardware and software of each machine,
enabling them to deploy and test distributed services at the same time.
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3.3 Experimental Setup for Performance Evaluation with Emulated Work-
loads
For the end-to-end performance and completion rate experiments under high-stress loads,
we decentralized a social graph on selected PL machines and used emulated application
workloads produced from studies on real social networks. The three metrics used in this
evaluation were: (1) end-to-end response time to quantify the performance as perceived
from an application point of view, (2) percentage of completion to quantify the tradeoff
between request response time and level of request completion, and (3) number of network
messages to quantify the service overhead.
3.3.1 PlanetLab Deployment
As mentioned earlier, the PL machines are shared among multiple research projects with
variable workloads and daily patterns. Therefore, their highly heterogeneous network,
computation and memory resources were scarce at times throughout our experiments. To
increase the number of stable and resourceful PL machines included in the experiments,
we used the CoMon tool [PP12] provided by the PL organization and polled the status
of the machines before each run of our experiments using the metrics shown in Table 3.1.
These strict status metrics reduced the potential set of peers to about 150. However, from
previous experience [KFA+10a] with Prometheus on PL, we concluded that such peers
are more appropriate for long-term experiments as they are typically more stable and
well-provisioned. From this set of peers, we handpicked 100 PL peers placed in multiple
countries around the globe for a good geographical coverage (Figure 3.1).
Our previous experience also showed that applications need to wait 10–20secs/hop for
a high response completion when many peers are involved in a multi-hop inference re-
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Table 3.1: Metrics used to select stable and resourceful PlanetLab peers for the
Prometheus deployment and testing.
Resource Availability
Total RAM ≥ 2GB
Free RAM ≥ 90%
Free Disk Space ≥ 20GB
Cores per CPU ≥ 2
% of free CPU ≥ 90%
Live Slices (allocated projects) ≤ 3
SSH & DNS Status responsive in last 2h
Figure 3.1: Geographical distribution of PlanetLab sites used in the Prometheus’
experiments.
quest. Therefore, for the end-to-end performance experiments, we set the application
timeout to 15 seconds for every social hop in the graph traversed by Prometheus to fulfill
an inference request at a high completion rate. This time is needed to tackle peer-to-
peer communication delays due to long round-trip-times (RTT) (200–300ms on average),
busy peer network interfaces (the PL peers were used by other researchers at the same
time), peer churn (for maintenance or network disconnections) and retransmissions of re-
quests to alternative peers. Prometheus uses this parameter by aggregating intermediate
results until the per hop timeout T is reached, and then sends these results back to the
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requesting peer. For the completion rate experiments we varied this timeout T to assess
the trade-off between end-to-end response time and completion rate of a request.
3.3.2 Decentralizing the Social Graph
We used a bidirectional graph of 1, 000 users with initial edge weight of 0.1. The graph
was created using a synthetic social graph generator described in [SCW+10] (a pseu-
docode of the algorithm used is presented in Appendix B), which consistently produces
graphs with properties such as degree distribution and clustering coefficient similar to real
social graphs. The properties of this graph are shown in Table 3.2.
As reported in [MMG+07] and [WBS+09], social networks such as Facebook, Youtube,
orkut and LiveJournal exhibit power-law degree distributions with exponents in the range
of 1.5 and 1.75. Furthermore, the average clustering coefficient of such networks is in the
range of 0.16 and 0.33. The synthetic graph exhibits an average clustering coefficient and
a power-law exponent close to the values found for these real social graphs.
Typical social graphs exhibit small-world properties [WS98], thus have small average
shortest path legths, similar to random graphs of equal size, but have a significantly larger
average clustering coefficient. If we compare the average shortest path length and average
clustering coefficient of the synthetic graph with a random graph of equal size, we observe
that the synthetic graph has a much larger clustering coefficient than the random graph
(as expected [WS98]), but a slightly smaller average path length than the random graph.
This can be attributed to the graph generator’s focus on preferential attachment which
increases connections between highly connected nodes [SCW+10], which leads to the over-
all reduction of the path lengths.
The graph size allowed for a realistic distribution of the 1, 000 users’ data on the 100
PL peers. We distributed the social graph on peers in two ways. In the first way, users’
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Table 3.2: Graph properties of the synthetic social graph used for the high-stress
experiments.
Nodes 1,000
Edges 5,846
Radius 5
Diameter 8
Average Degree 11.692
Average Eccentricity 6.061
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.328
Average Shortest Path Length 3.545
Power-law Distribution Exponent 1.39
Average Clustering Coefficient of a random graph 0.0117
Average Shortest Path Length of a random graph 3.912
social data are stored on randomly selected peers. Consequently, groups of random users
are mapped on the same peer. We will refer to this as the random mapping of users on
peers. In the second way, we assume that groups of socially-connected users share the
resources provided by a peer possibly contributed by a member of the group. Therefore,
social groups of users are mapped on peers, reflecting a more realistic scenario of social
data decentralization. We will refer to this as the social mapping of users on peers.
In our experiments, we created such a social mapping by using a modified version of the
community detection algorithm introduced in [GN02] that allowed us to control the num-
ber of communities and their average size. The algorithm takes as input a social graph,
the number of communities to be identified (which in our case is the number of peers in
the system) and the minimum acceptable community size. The algorithm iteratively re-
moves the social edge with the highest edge betweenness centrality [GN02] if by removing
it a new community of the desired size is created. Removal of edges continues until the
specified number of communities is met. Users from a given community are then mapped
on the same peer.
However, even in the social mapping, neighboring communities in the social graph were
mapped on random peers worldwide. This setup implies that geographically-close commu-
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nities could store their information on random peers across the globe, which allowed us to
examine a worst case performance of the platform with respect to network delays. More-
over, we assumed users defined ACPs that allowed access to all their data from all users.
Therefore, any user could submit requests to access data of any other user and proceed
over multiple hops, consequently stressing the system even further with the maximum
graph traversal load.
The placement (mapping) of user data on peers introduces bias on the delays of requests
between peers. Furthermore, although we did not apply any peer churn, and despite our
efforts to pick stable nodes, random PL peers exhibited an average churn of up to 5%
of the peers used during the experimental runs, which lasted 8 hours each. Therefore,
splitting the application workload among initial peers (i.e., each peer submits requests
only for a particular set of users) would have amplified this bias on the request perfor-
mance. To minimize this bias, each peer probabilistically submitted the same application
workload on behalf of the social graph’s users and we report averaged results across all
peers.
The average number of users mapped per peer, N , was set to 10, 30 and 50. The number
of PL peers was kept constant to 100, forcing the user groups to overlap with each other
for N>10 users/peer. This resembles the realistic scenario of overlapping social circles of
users with some users participating in more than one circle (peer), and thus having mul-
tiple trusted peers. In effect, user’s data were replicated on K=N/10 peers on average,
hence K=1, 3 and 5 trusted peers/user.
3.3.3 Emulated Workloads
We emulated the workload of one social sensor and two social applications based on pre-
vious system characterizations [WBS+09, KGA08, GCX+05]. The emulated social sen-
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sor tested the ability of the platform to manage and incorporate new social input with
the existing data of users while under high-stress load. The emulated social applications
tested the end-to-end performance of the neighborhood and social strength requests.
3.3.3.1 Social Sensor Input
We emulated a Facebook social input based on a Facebook trace analysis [WBS+09]. The
workload was characterized by the probability distribution function (PDF) for users to
post comments on their friends’ Facebook walls and photos.
Users were ranked into groups based on their social degree and each group was mapped
onto a probability class using the cumulative distribution function (CDF) from Figure 8
in [WBS+09], as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Probability distribution function for social inputs, based on a Facebook
study. [WBS+09].
Social Degree % Total Group assigned Probability to
Rank (Top%) Interaction (CDF) to user choose user (PDF)
5 40.0 1 0.400
10 60.0 2 0.200
20 80.0 3 0.200
30 90.0 4 0.100
40 95.0 5 0.050
50 97.5 6 0.025
>50 100.0 7 0.025
To emulate a social interaction from user ego to user alter, a group was selected based
on its associated probability, and a user ego from the group (who was not selected yet)
was picked as the source of input. User alter was randomly selected from ego’s direct
social connections, to maintain the small-world properties of the graph. The weight of
each input was kept constant to 0.01 for all users. Due to the fact that users were picked
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based on their social degree, users with higher social degree probabilistically produced
more input, leading to higher weights on their corresponding edges in the social graph.
3.3.3.2 Neighborhood Inference Requests
In order to create a workload for the neighborhood inference requests, we used an analy-
sis of Twitter traces [KGA08]. Twitter [Twi12a] is a micro-blogging website that allows
its users to share information at real-time. The sharing happens via small bursts of in-
formation called tweets, which can be at most 140 characters long. Each user can follow
other users’ stream of tweets that she finds interesting. Thus, she can be characterized
by the number of followers she has over the number of users she follows, or the ratio R of
Followers/Following and the number of tweets she produces.
According to the study [KGA08], we can classify the users into three main categories:
1) the broadcasters are heavily followed but they follow very few other users and publish
a lot of tweets (e.g., news station, artists, etc), 2) the acquaintances are typical OSN
users who tend to reciprocate the follow action of others (similar to “friendship” in Face-
book) and they broadcast a moderate number of tweets, 3) the spammers are heavily
spamming other users with following requests and do not tweet that often.
Depending on the content of a tweet, users may choose to repost it on their account sta-
tus and this action can continue for multiple hops in the social graph, leading to a rapid
spread of a tweet. Therefore, we can intuitively associate a tweet such as “Go Bulls! Let’s
meet for a drink after the football game”, with a Prometheus neighborhood request (cen-
tered at the leader of the tweet) which traverses the social graph for a number of social
hops h, over a label football and some minimum weight w.
We used the Twitter analysis to extract the probability distribution function of submitted
neighborhood requests. We assumed that the users in our social graph were of the second
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category (i.e. acquaintances) and thus had a ratio R close to one (which could also be
reflected by the ratio in/out degree). From [KGA08] we observed that users with R ' 1
but with increased absolute number of followers and following (i.e. higher social degree)
tend to tweet more. Therefore, using Figure 4 in [KGA08], each user was assigned to a
group with a particular twitter count based on their degree.
Each user group was mapped onto a particular probability to be selected and submit a
neighborhood request, as shown in Table 3.4. We assumed that users from the last group
produced about half the tweets of users from the previous group, since numbers were
not provided in the study. Once the group was selected, a user (who was not selected
yet) was picked to be the source of the request. The number of hops for the request was
randomly picked from 1, 2 or 3 hops and the weight was randomly picked from the set
of values 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.10. Applying a weight threshold ≤0.1 on the inference requests
produced a high-stress load since all edges had an initial weight of 0.1.
Table 3.4: Probability distribution function for the neighborhood requests, based on a
Twitter study. [KGA08].
Degree Number Group assigned Probability to
of tweets to user choose user (PDF)
100-1000 1727 1 0.544
10-100 964 2 0.304
0-10 482 3 0.152
3.3.3.3 Social Strength Inference Request
In order to create a workload for the social strength inference requests, we used an anal-
ysis of BitTorrent traces [GCX+05]. BitTorrent [Coh03] is currently the most popular
P2P file-sharing protocol and responsible for about a third of the internet’s traffic around
the world [SM09]. It allows users to distribute files to other users in a decentralized way,
therefore eliminating the need of a centralized server with bandwidth and computation
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limitations. Via a cooperation mechanism in the protocol, each file is split into chunks,
and peers (i.e., users) participating in the sharing of the file are organized into a swarm.
Peers or leechers in a swarm may download chunks of the file from the other swarm peers
(seeds), but also upload chunks they currently have, thus contributing back to the swarm.
A battery-aware BitTorrent application [KBI09] could run on mobile devices and users
could rely on social incentives to be allowed to temporarily “free ride” the system (i.e., do
not upload any chunks to other users) when low on battery. Members of the same swarm
(i.e., they have interest in the same file) could check their social strength with the needy
leecher to see if they want to contribute by uploading on her behalf. This translates into
a series of social strength requests submitted to Prometheus by random users participat-
ing in BitTorrent swarms.
Therefore, for the social strength workload we assumed that users participated at ran-
dom in BitTorrent swarms. Two users were randomly selected as the source and des-
tination of the social strength inference request. The source user was associated with
a total number of requests she would submit throughout the experiment. This number
was extracted by the torrent request distribution from the analysis of BitTorrent traces
(Figure 9b in [GCX+05]), as shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Probability distribution function for the social strength requests, based on a
BitTorrent study. [GCX+05].
Number of torrent requests Probability to choose
(i.e., social strength requests) user (PDF)
to submit during experiment
1 0.450
2 0.144
4 0.178
8 0.104
15 0.079
25 0.026
35 0.015
45 0.004
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3.4 Performance Evaluation with Emulated Workloads
In the first two experiments, we deployed Prometheus on PlanetLab to test the perfor-
mance of the system’s functionalities in a real distributed environment. During these
experiments, we used high-stress workloads from the two emulated social applications
and the social input as described earlier, while varying inference request parameters such
as users involved in the request and number of social hops to be traversed. The first set
of experiments was performed under a constant, but relatively long, timeout per hop
T = 15 seconds to allow high completion rate of inference requests. The second set of
experiments was performed with a variable timeout per hop, as it would be selected by
each application, to assess variability in the quality of results returned (completion rate)
vs. end-to-end performance.
3.4.1 End-to-End Performance
The first set of experiments had two goals: (1) to measure Prometheus’ performance over
a widely distributed network such as PL, and (2) to assess the effect of socially-aware
trusted peer selection on the system’s overall performance. For every experimental run,
more than 1 million social strength and neighborhood requests and more than 100 thou-
sand social inputs were submitted from the emulated applications and social aggregator.
Figures 3.2– 3.4 show the cumulative distribution function of the end-to-end average re-
sponse time for the neighborhood inference for different social hops and number of users
per peer. We do not include the results for the social strength inference as its performance
is almost identical to the one for neighborhood for 2 hops. The reason is that this function
has to verify all the possible paths between two users within at most 2 social hops of each
other. We formulate the following lessons from this set of experiments.
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Figure 3.2: CDF of the average end-to-end response time of the neighborhood inference for
the random and social mappings, different social hops for 10 users per peer, with T = 15
seconds. The distributions of the social mapping were found statistically different from
the random mapping using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with p < 0.0001 and test
statistics k = 0.0132, k = 0.2276 and k = 0.1641 for 1, 2 and 3 social hop requests,
respectively.
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Figure 3.3: CDF of the average end-to-end response time of the neighborhood inference for
the random and social mappings, different social hops for 30 users per peer, with T = 15
seconds. The distributions of the social mapping were found statistically different from
the random mapping using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with p < 0.0001 and test
statistics k = 0.0180, k = 0.2771 and k = 0.2918 for 1, 2 and 3 social hop requests,
respectively.
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Figure 3.4: CDF of the average end-to-end response time of the neighborhood inference for
the random and social mappings, different social hops for 50 users per peer, with T = 15
seconds. The distributions of the social mapping were found statistically different from
the random mapping using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with p < 0.0001 and test
statistics k = 0.0480, k = 0.2642 and k = 0.1710 for 1, 2 and 3 social hop requests,
respectively.
Lesson 1: The social-based mapping of users onto peers leads to significant improvements
in end-to-end response time and reduction in message overhead. In all cases of users/peer,
the social mapping leads to faster responses of requests than the random mapping. For
the case of 30 users/peer, gains of up to 20–25% in response time over the random map-
ping are observed. The difference is more visible for 2 and 3 hops, as the 1 hop function
is computed either locally at the submitting peer or the first available trusted peer of the
source user. For the case of 50 users/peer, the system continues to perform better with
the social than the random mapping, but the improvements are smaller than between
10 and 30 users/peer. This is because under this case, the average number of peers that
must be contacted for information is reduced for both mappings. However, the reduction
is more prominent in the random mapping, and thus we notice more improvement on the
random than the social mapping.
In all cases, the social mapping outperforms the random mapping since it needs signif-
icantly less number of messages to fulfill the same requests. For 10 users per peer, the
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system with social mapping has 38.4% reduction in message overhead over the random
mapping. The average message overhead is increased in the case of 30 users per peer
under the social mapping. This is because the increase in number of users per peer (N)
from 10 to 30 also increases the number of peers per user (K) from 1 to 3, which adds
alternative peers in the system for the users that their requests failed in the N = 10
case. However, the social mapping still outperforms the random mapping with 16.3% less
message overhead. Increasing further the number of users per peer reduces the overall
number of messages needed as the number of peers to be contacted is also reduced in
both mappings. Still, the social mapping leads to 37.3% less message overhead than the
random mapping.
Lesson 2: Increasing the service availability through data replication and number of users
per peer improves end-to-end response time and reduces message overhead. Our experi-
mental design has the following specifics: by increasing the average number of users who
are mapped on a peer (N), we also increase the average number of trusted peers per user
(K), and therefore, service availability for that user. In general, since inference requests
for a user can be fulfilled by any of her trusted peers, we observe that increasing the avail-
ability of users’ data by a factor of 3 to 5 times, and correspondingly increasing the num-
ber of users mapped per peer, improves the end-to-end performance by up to 25% (when
K=3) and reduces the message overhead in the system by ∼30%, on average. This overall
performance gain is due to the following two reasons. First, having more user data on
each peer allows for a higher portion of each request to complete locally on the peer, and
therefore fewer peers need to be contacted, i.e., fewer network peer hops. Second, given
high peer churn and vulnerable P2P communication, more service availability per user
means more alternative trusted peers to contact for an inference request to be fulfilled
faster.
Lesson 3: Creating the TPL can be an expensive operation. A request for a user X can
arrive at any random peer. This peer has to first create X’s TPL, and then forward the
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request to X’s network-wise closest trusted peer (as explained in 2.3.3). This operation
involves several time-consuming lookups in the DHT, which result in multiple peer traver-
sals. The distribution of the overhead associated with the cold start of creating a user’s
TPL over the PL infrastructure had a 50th, 90th, and 99th percentile of 1.05, 2.15 and
8.78 seconds, respectively (as shown in Figure 3.5). Thus, for the majority of the users
this process can be fast, but for some unfortunate users it can take as much as 8–10 sec-
onds. Similar delays (6–10 seconds) were reported in [SVCC09] for the group activities
of the Vis-a-Vis system running over PL nodes. To mitigate this problem, Prometheus
caches the TPL as explained in 2.3.3. The graphs in Figures 3.2– 3.4 show the perfor-
mance using this caching mechanism, since we are interested in testing Prometheus’ per-
formance in inference execution and not in DHT lookups.
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Figure 3.5: CDF of the time needed for a peer to create a trusted peer list of a user in
PlanetLab.
Lesson 4: The response time is relatively high due to the overloaded testbed, especially
for 2 and 3 hops. In our worldwide PL testbed, the average RTT was 200-300 ms. In
addition, the testbed was generally loaded with other projects running along with ours,
thus leading to about 1–2 seconds just to establish a reliable TCP connection to submit
a request to a peer or receive an inference result from a peer. The response time greatly
depends on the number of hops to be traveled by the request and the number of peers to
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be contacted at each hop. Even though the aggregation of a request result is executed
in parallel per social hop, multiple peers must be contacted per hop, with potentially
long response delays to complete a request at the highest rate possible. For example, for
10 users/peer in the social (random) mapping, an average of 37 (48) peers have to be
contacted to collect neighborhood results from users located 3 social hops away from the
source user (the number of users returned is 350 on average). Such a request took about
30–35 seconds to reach ∼100% completion rate, given the 15-second timeout per hop.
Lesson 5: Caching optimizations and geographic social graph decentralization allows better
scalability. By placing socially-close communities on random peers, we examined a rather
pessimistic experimental scenario of longer than expected delays for request execution.
However, in reality, we expect neighboring communities in the social graph being placed
in geographically close peers (e.g., same country peers) instead of random, which could
effectively reduce delays by one order of magnitude, since the average (median) RTT be-
tween PL peers of the same country was 25.5 (15.7) msec in our experiments for over 35
countries, as seen in Figure 3.6. To further reduce execution delays, we plan to implement
caching of recently computed results as well as pre-computing results in the background.
These methods are expected to work well as the social graph rarely changes [Gol07] and
will allow the inference execution to scale easier to thousands of peers.
3.4.2 Response Time vs. Completion Rate
In general, the longer an application is willing to wait, the more complete the information
returned by the social inference is. In the previous experiments we assumed that a long
timeout of T=15 seconds per hop offers a very high completion rate for requests fulfilled
in the PL infrastructure. We designed a second set of experiments to measure the trade-
off between end-to-end response time and response completion rate, when applications use
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Figure 3.6: CDF of the round trip time (RTT) between same-country peers in PlanetLab.
variable timeout T=2.5, 5.0, 7.5, 10.0 seconds, using a social mapping of 30 users/peer for
the 1000-user social graph.
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Figure 3.7: CDF of the average end-to-end response time of the 2-hop neighborhood
inference for the social mapping, with 30 users per peer and varying timeout values.
Figure 3.7 and 3.8 show the CDF of the end-to-end response times for neighborhood re-
quests of 2 and 3 social hops, respectively (a request of 1 social hop cannot timeout).
For both request types, we can clearly see the effect of the timeout in the end-to-end
response time performance. Furthermore, in the 3-hop requests, we notice a more promi-
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Figure 3.8: CDF of the average end-to-end response time of the 3-hop neighborhood
inference for the social mapping, with 30 users per peer and varying timeout values.
nent use of the retransmission policy (also seen in Figures 3.2– 3.4 but in a lesser degree)
and especially in the cases of 7.5 and 10 seconds. Using the theoretical results shown in
Figure 2.10, we notice that case (c) with one timeout and 4 remote messages (4TR) is
the most prominent for the 3-hop requests with one timeout and the case (d) with two
timeouts and 2 remote messages (2TR) the next more prominent.
In a system such as PlanetLab, the time delays TA and TD are not truly negligible and
the minimum time delay of one remote message (TR) cannot be zero, as assumed in the
analysis of Section 2.3.8. Therefore, the requests exhibit an even longer delay to be ful-
filled, and this delay presents a multi-step variability, depending on what portion of the
requests was executed in 1, 2 or 3 network hops and at what network hop there were
timeouts involved.
Figure 3.9 shows the cumulative distribution function of the average completion percent-
age of the 3-hop neighborhood requests under different application-set timeout values.
The results for 1 and 2 hops showed practically 100% completion for all requests and
timeout values and are omitted for brevity. Overall, we observe a clear trade-off between
request completion rate and application waiting time for response. For example, when
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Figure 3.9: CDF of the average completion percentage of 3–hop neighborhood requests
for varying timeout values.
T=7.5(10)seconds, about 50%(80%) of the requests have > 90% completion. A real-time
social application—e.g., “using the proximity inference, invite my 2-hop football contacts
for celebration of the team’s victory”—could set a low timeout for quick, yet incomplete,
results.
3.5 Performance Evaluation with Real Mobile Application
We validate the usability of Prometheus as a social data management service by develop-
ing a mobile social application, CallCensor, that utilizes the Prometheus inference func-
tions through the exposed API, under real-time constraints. Past work (ContextPhone
from University of Helsinki [ROPT05]) introduced an application called ContextContact
which offers cues to the caller about the callee’s social context such as location, colloca-
tion with other people, phone ringer status, etc. Our application builds on these lessons
and allows the callee’s phone to adjust the phone ring based on the owner’s social context
and the social relationship with the caller. We measured its end-to-end performance using
a real multi-graph of 100 users.
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The CallCensor application leverages social information received from Prometheus to
decide whether or not to allow incoming calls to go through. In addition to the social in-
formation from Prometheus, this application also uses the phone location and collocation
via BT with other phones, to infer whether the user is at work and in a meeting (e.g., in
the boss’s office).
For each incoming call, the application queries Prometheus with a social strength or neigh-
borhood inference request to assess the type of social connection between the caller and
the phone owner. Based on the owner settings (e.g., don’t allow personal calls while at
work), the application decides if the phone should ring, vibrate or silence upon receiving
the call. The application was written in Java for devices running Google Android OS and
was tested on a Nexus One mobile phone from HTC (1GHz CPU, 512MB RAM).
There are multiple scenarios a caller can be connected to the phone’s owner; we tested
three: directly connected within 1 social hop, indirectly connect by 2 social hops, and
connected with a high social strength. We tested each of these scenarios 50 times. For
each of them, the ego and alter were randomly chosen, and the inference request was sent
to a random peer.
We assumed users defined ACPs allowing access to all their data, thus enabling requests
to proceed over multiple hops, and consequently stressing the system at maximum possi-
ble load. We measured the end-to-end response time of an inference request submitted to
Prometheus. This experiment introduced additional overhead due to the communication
between the mobile application and Prometheus, and the processing time by the mobile
application.
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3.5.1 Social Multi-Graph from Real Traces
The social graph used in the CallCensor application experiments was based on data col-
lected at NJIT [PBB11]. The graph has two types of edges, representing Facebook friends
and Bluetooth collocation. Mobile phones were distributed to students and collocation
data (determined via Bluetooth addresses discovered periodically by each mobile device)
were sent to a server. The same set of subjects installed a Facebook application to pro-
vide their friend lists and participate in a survey.
The user set was small (100 users) compared to the size of the student body (9, 000),
therefore resulting in a somewhat sparse graph. About half of the subjects reported less
than 24 hours of data over the span of a month. The collocation data have two thresholds
of 45 and 90 minutes for users to have spent together. Thus, the 90 minute collocations
comprise a subgraph of the 45 minute collocations. A summary of the graph properties
(when flattened) is shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Graph properties of the multi-graph produced using real collocation and
Facebook data from NJIT. [PBB11].
Nodes 100
Edges 469
Average Degree 9.38
Average Eccentricity 4.47
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.37
Average Shortest Path Length 2.50
Power-law Distribution Exponent 1.37
While the graph edges were not initially weighted, we applied synthetic weights of 0.1
for “Facebook” edges, 0.1 for “collocation” of 45 minutes and 0.2 for “collocation” of 90
minutes. For the mobile application experiments, we consider the “collocation” edges to
represent a work relationship, while the “Facebook” edges represent a personal relation-
ship. The user (ego) was assumed to be in a work environment when another user (alter)
called.
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Figure 3.10 illustrates this graph and demonstrates one of Prometheus’ features: using
multi-edge graphs provides for better connectivity between users. Neither the “Facebook”
nor the “collocation” graph is connected, but the graph containing both types of edges
is. We equally distributed the NJIT graph with a social mapping on three PL nodes in
the US. Splitting this 100 user-graph on 3 PL peers implies a similar ratio of users/peer
as before (about 30 users/peer), while testing 1 and 2 hop inference execution on a real
multi-graph.
Figure 3.10: Real multi-graph with Facebook edges (black dashed lines) and collocation
edges (red continuous lines). Line thickness demonstrates edge weight (for collocation
edges).
3.5.2 Application Response Performance
Figure 3.11 presents the performance for the requests sent by CallCensor, for each of
the three scenarios examined. The results show the time spent by the requests only in
Prometheus and the overall time needed by the CallCensor to request and handle a re-
sponse. We first observe that the results meet the time constraints of the application: the
66
��
����
����
����
����
����
����
����
����
����
��
�� �� �� �� ��
�
�
�
�� �����
���� ������������
���� ������������
���� ����������
�����������������
�����������������
���������������
Figure 3.11: CDF of average end-to-end response time for CallCensor, under three social
inference function requests: 1 and 2 hops neighborhood requests and social strength (SocS)
requests.
response must arrive and the ring must be adjusted before the call is forwarded to the
voicemail of the callee (we used the default voicemail time setting).
Second, we notice that the application itself introduced a significant overhead: for exam-
ple, as much as 100% in the 1–hop neighborhood and 50% in the 2–hop neighborhood and
social strength, due to both communication overhead and execution time on the mobile
phone. Third, we confirm the similarity of the social strength results with the neighbor-
hood for 2 social hops, as found in the first set of experiments. Fourth, the 2-hop request
results using this small social graph are similar in performance with the larger 1000-user
graph used before (social mapping, 30 users/peer). In particular, more than 70% of re-
quests finished within 2.5 seconds in both setups, which leads us to believe that similar
performance of the mobile application could be expected in a larger social graph dis-
tributed over hundreds of peers.
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Chapter 4: Resilience to Malicious Attacks in Prometheus
A social data management service can be the target of attacks at different levels of the
system (Figure 4.1): 1) at the infrastructure level, 2) at the social graph level, 3) at the
service level, and 4) at the application level. Depending on the architecture of the system
(centralized or decentralized), defenses can be more effective and easier to implement. In
this Chapter we discuss how the design characteristics of Prometheus enable the system
to resist such attacks, or mitigate their effects on users.
Infrastructure Level
Social Graph Level
Manipulate graph structure
Create/modify edges
Service Level
Manipulate social inferences
Drop requests, modify results
Application Level
Misuse social data
by applications
DDoS, attacks on DHT,
routing, storage, network `
`` `
`
`
CallCensor SofaSurfer
Figure 4.1: Attacks can target a social data management service at different system
levels.
First, attacks at the infrastructure level such as denial of service attacks can target both
the servers of a centralized system and the peers participating in a decentralized system.
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A decentralized system such as a P2P network, however, can be the target of additional
attacks on the infrastructure, with a goal to disrupt the communications (routing of mes-
sages between peers) or storage of content in the system. The main classes of attacks on
DHT-based P2P systems are: 1) the Sybil attack, 2) the Eclipse attack, and 3) attacks
on the routing and storage functionalities of the system. Solutions to such attacks are re-
viewed in [UPvS11]. Attacks at the infrastructure level are out of the scope of this work.
Second, attacks on the social graph aim to manipulate the graph structure by creating
or modifying social edges between users. Centralized systems have complete knowledge
of the social graph and monitor its changes due to user activity. Thus, it can be easier to
detect when malicious users, independently or in collaboration, create artificial edges with
honest users to gain access to their social data (e.g., Facebook Immune System [SCM11]).
However, not all such defenses are successful [BMBR11] and more research is needed to
address such attacks. Decentralized systems can also employ techniques (e.g., [YKGF06,
YGKX08]) to defend against such attacks, but they are typically more expensive and
less effective due to the distributed nature of the social graph. In Section 4.1 we discuss
how the characteristics of the social graph maintained by Prometheus, i.e., a directional,
labeled and weighted social graph, protect users against many variants of these attacks.
Third, attacks at the service level attempt to manipulate inferences on the social graph
(drop requests, modify results, etc). A centralized system such as Facebook can claim
trust in the social inferences on the social graph, since it controls the access and use of
its servers. Such attacks are more effective on decentralized systems due to the different
level of guarantees that distributed, user-contributed peers can provide. In Section 4.2
we discuss how the socially-aware design of Prometheus increases the system resilience to
these attacks.
Finally, we consider attacks at the application level. Centralized systems expose the so-
cial data of users to 3rd party applications and services through APIs. However, users
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typically have limited or no control on the exposure and use of their data from such 3rd
party services, as seen by the numerous attacks on users with email spam and phishing
campaigns [Sym11, BCF09], as well as collection of private information from online social
aggregators such as Spokeo [Spo12]. Prometheus enables applications to mine the rich
social graph stored in the system via social inference functions, but allows users to con-
trol access to their social data via fine-grained access control policies. In Section 4.3 we
discuss how Prometheus can defend against attacks at the application level.
4.1 Attacks at the Social Graph Level
It has been shown that attackers are able to create social edges with honest users in so-
cial networks (e.g., Koobface [BCF09, Dan09, Vam08]), or bias them to reciprocate social
edges [CM08]. Moreover, these attacks can be automated using socialbots [BMBR11] and
current defense systems are not capable of detecting and stopping the majority of such
attacks (e.g., Facebook [SCM11]).
The reciprocation of a social edge (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, etc) usually means partial or
complete access to honest users’ social data. These data could include online profiles and
personal information and can be used for email spam and phishing campaigns [Sym11,
BCF09], or sold to the black market for identity thefts. A more subtle attack could in-
clude efforts to manipulate public opinion on sensitive issues, for example with respect to
public health [Mor09] or political elections [RCM+11, Mis11].
Because Prometheus maintains a directed social graph, manipulating it effectively is more
challenging. While it is relatively easy to create an edge from the attacker to the victim,
creating the reciprocal edge from the victim to the attacker is not in the attacker’s con-
trol. Next, we examine these two scenarios in more detail.
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4.1.1 Creating Social Edge from Attacker to Victim
Attackers could bias their social sensors to create directed edges towards victims to ma-
nipulate the social graph and access their social data. For example, Alice could repeat-
edly email a large number of users to create a social edge with them. These edges could
be of different labels and weights, in an effort to cover a wide range of social activities
that honest users interact with each other.
However, no matter how many edges she creates with various labels and weights, the di-
rectionality of these edges will always be from her to victims, thus restricting their effec-
tiveness when it comes to affecting or even accessing honest users’ social data. Therefore,
even though she can include in her 1-hop neighborhood the entire social graph, she will
not be part of any honest user’s 1-hop (or n-hop) social neighborhood.
4.1.2 Reciprocating Social Edge from Victim to Attacker
An attacker Alice can try via social engineering [Gal11] or other means (for example,
socialbots [BMBR11]) to convince an honest user Bob to reciprocate an edge to her. Bob
can defend against such attackers using Prometheus inferences or SybilLimit-based tech-
niques [YGKX08].
However, if this attack is successful, Alice (and her malicious 1-hop neighborhood) may
be able to access part of his social data, depending on Bob’s access control policies. This
could also lead to a more subtle attack on complex social inferences such as the social
strength. In the next paragraphs we examine in more detail the two defense mechanisms
that Bob can use to reduce the reciprocation of social edges to attackers, as well as the
attack on the complex social inference requests.
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4.1.2.1 Defense via Prometheus Inferences
Bob could consult his direct social neighborhood about Alice before establishing an edge
with her. Individuals typically share a significant number of social contacts (i.e., people
have common friends with each other) and this overlap of friends is an indication of the
strength of their social relationship [OSH+07]. Therefore, Bob could query Prometheus
for his 2-hop social neighborhood (i.e., the direct contacts of his contacts), to establish if
Alice appears in his friends’ 1-hop neighborhood, and if she does, under what edge label
and corresponding weight.
Note that a similar mechanism has been used by Facebook [Fac12b] to allow users to
recover their account password through 3 of their friends. However, the particular Face-
book mechanism has also been shown to be vulnerable to Sybil attacks via social en-
gineering [Gal11]. Instead, our proposed mechanism takes into account edge labels and
weights, and allows for a more collective decision to take place between friends regarding
a stranger, emphasizing Prometheus’ socially-aware design.
4.1.2.2 Defense via SybilLimit-based Techniques
Bob could apply a SybilLimit-based technique [YGKX08] to traverse his social graph and
investigate if this social edge is legitimate or not. This technique assumes that attackers
such as Alice, with potentially multiple or Sybil identities in the system, are concentrated
within a Sybil region and attack the honest users H via a specific set of social edges SG,
or attack edges. Such a defense mechanism provides guarantees that each honest user
could reciprocate at most O(logH) social edges to attackers in the social graph, per at-
tack edge in the set SG, even when |SG| = o(H/logH). Given the technique’s decision,
Bob can accept an edge or not. As an extension to this technique, if the social edge is not
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accepted, it can be placed under “quarantine”, until Bob has enough interaction history
with Alice to reconsider his decision on the edge formation.
4.1.2.3 Manipulating Complex Inference Requests
Alice could partially influence complex requests such as social strength, that traverse the
social graph over different types of edges and weights to reach users that are directly or
indirectly connected.
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Figure 4.2: User attack on the social graph: Alice creates a fake edge to Cary with high
weight to bias inferences from Bob to Cary.
Assume that Alice has a reciprocal edge with Bob and creates a fake edge with high weight
to another attacker Cary who also managed to create a reciprocal edge from Bob to her,
as in Figure 4.2. Given that Bob submitted a social strength request between him and
Cary, the request will search the social graph to identify the path (direct or indirect)
with the highest strength (as explained in Section 2.3). The fake edge between Alice and
Cary can cause the reported social strength between Bob and Cary to be 0.1 whereas
without the fake edge it would be 0.01. Thus, Alice can mislead such a request originat-
ing from Bob to utilize the indirect social path of Bob to Cary through her, instead of the
direct path between the two users.
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In general, an attacker Alice could cause any social strength request from a user directly
connected to her to be artificially increased. In theory, this implies that Alice could en-
force a minimum social strength to any other user within her 1–hop neighborhood, given
that she is in their 1–hop neighborhood as well. In practice however, even though Alice
can easily create outbound edges, she has little control over the creation of inbound edges,
their label and weight, as well as if she will be granted access from Bob through his ACPs.
The above example demonstrates the need for further investigation of attacks when con-
sidering the implementation of complex inferences such as the social strength.
4.2 Attacks at the Service Level
Prometheus allows users to store their social data on particular peers based on out-of-
band trust with the peer owners. Therefore, users can assume that these peers will not
act maliciously while hosting their data and during the execution of an inference request.
If such a peer acts maliciously, the peer and its owner can be flagged accordingly (black-
listed) in the ACPs of all honest users so that future requests initiated from the particu-
lar peer and user are dropped and requests are not sent to the specific peer for service.
As explained earlier in the inference function execution (Section 2.3.7), if a peer does not
have the social data necessary to fulfill a request locally, a different peer must provide
them. In fact, in a decentralized system such as Prometheus, many peers can participate
in the execution of a single inference request. This depends on how the social graph is
decentralized in the system and the type of request and the n-hop distance it will travel
on the social graph, which can translate to multiple network hops in the P2P system.
Prometheus’ design enables users to decentralize their social graph in a socially-aware
manner, since socially connected users can store their data on the same peer, therefore
reducing the number of peers needed to be queried during inference execution. However,
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Figure 4.3: Example of peer influence. The red peer (D) can affect the requests submit-
ted from the blue peers (A, B or C) that pass through peer D to reach peers E–J or
results returned from these peers.
even with this design, multiple peers may need to be queried and in a system that pro-
tects user privacy, a requestor cannot distinguish how and from which peer any given
item entered the result set.
Therefore, the intermediate peers serving a multi-hop inference request cannot be iden-
tified from the requester. Consequently, for Alice to mount a successful attack at the
service level, she would have to control such intermediate peers in the system. These
peers could have the opportunity to drop incoming requests, modify intermediate results
sent to other peers, or change the parameters of secondary requests sent to new peers
(Figure 4.3).
For example, if a malicious peer serves the ith hop of a n-hop request, it can “override”
the results of the ith+1 to the nth hop of its leg of the request and remain undetected.
Moreover, if malicious peers collude with each other (either because they are owned or
have been compromised by the same attacker) they can increase the magnitude of the
attack at the service level.
In this section we experimentally investigate how the socially-aware design of Prometheus
increases the system resilience to such attacks at the service level, under different experi-
mental setups.
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4.2.1 Peer Influence
We studied system resilience to attacks on inference request execution by measuring peers’
opportunity to influence results when serving a neighborhood inference request. We define
a peer’s influence on requests as the fraction of requests that the peer serviced over the
total number of requests issued in the system, during a period of time t:
peer influence =
number of requests the peer serviced during period t
total number of requests issued during period t
This fraction represents the overall opportunity of a peer to serve, and thus potentially
manipulate the results of any given request issued.
A peer’s influence on a request increases with the number of social hops the request tra-
verses the graph, since, probabilistically, there are more chances the peer will participate
in the request’s graph traversal. We do not consider the first hop (i.e., the source peer) of
a request as malicious, since if it is, no results can be considered legitimate. We consider
the worst case scenario in which we do not restrict the weight of the social relationships
used, all edges are reciprocal and users define ACPs allowing access to all their data, thus
enabling requests to proceed over multiple peer hops.
Next, we extend our preliminary work [BKI11] and experimentally evaluate the influ-
ence malicious peers have over social inference execution on a distributed social graph.
We performed three sets of experiments and extracted lessons regarding the system’s
resilience with respect to inference execution. During the experiments, an n-hop neigh-
borhood request was performed for each ego (user) in the social graph. This request was
submitted to the peer the user was mapped to, i.e. peer P0, which could fulfill requests
regarding information only about users mapped to P0. For users in subsequent social
hops from ego that P0 did not have social data, P0 randomly chose one of the peers stor-
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ing the particular users’ data and submitted secondary requests to be fulfilled by those
peers. Each time a peer served a secondary request, we increased the peer’s influence.
4.2.2 Peer Influence on a Synthetic Graph
The first set of experiments was performed on the 1000-user synthetic graph (same graph
used in Section 3.4) distributed on 100 peers. In this set of experiments we studied the
peer influence by identifying and mapping communities onto peers using the algorithm
from Section 3.3.2. This algorithm allowed us to control the size and number of communi-
ties as well as the average replication factor of users’ social data (K). Therefore, multiple
copies of a user’s data were allowed and thus multiple trusted peers for each user.
To eliminate any bias introduced by the random peer selection, we performed 100 itera-
tions of each experimental configuration and report the average influence. Since we reach
nearly 100% of the users in the 1000-user social graph within 4 hops, we only measured
influence for 2, 3, and 4 hop requests. To produce random mappings while preserving
the community size distribution, we used the community sizes produced by the social
mappings and shuﬄed the users randomly between communities.
Figure 4.4 plots the cumulative distribution function of the average influence of peers in
neighborhood requests for the synthetic graph, for different combinations of users per
peer and number of hops per request and for social and random mappings of users onto
peers. From these results we formulate the following lesson.
Lesson 1: The socially-aware mapping of users onto peers reduces the average opportunity
of peers to influence requests. From the results in Figure 4.4 we observe that the random
mapping leads to an overall steady influence rate on peers, depending on the number of
hops. On the other hand, the social mapping leads more than 85% of peers to have less
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Figure 4.4: CDF of average peer influence for random and social mappings of the
synthetic graph, for combinations of users per peer and number of hops per request.
average influence than peers in the random mapping, even though this influence increases
and is also depended on the number of hops.
We can explain this result if we consider that in a social mapping, socially-close users are
mapped to the same peers, increasing the likelihood that more hops are served locally
when compared to randomly mapped users on peers. This also implies that a social map-
ping results in fewer secondary requests sent in the system (regardless of the way com-
munities were identified and mapped on peers), and therefore supports our performance
results (Chapter 3) which showed inferences on a socially-mapped graph to execute faster
than on a randomly-mapped graph.
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4.2.3 Peer Influence on Real Graphs
In our second set of experiments we studied the peer influence on five larger graphs based
on real traces from diverse application domains, such as file sharing using peer-to-peer
protocols (Gnutella, [RIF02]), email communications between company employees (En-
ron, [Les12]), trust on consumer reviews (Epinions, [Les12]) and friendships in a news
website (Slashdot, [Les12]). We considered all networks undirected and unweighted and
used only the largest connected component from each graph to ensure reachability be-
tween all pairs of users.
The time complexity of the community detection algorithm used in Section 3.3.2 is very
high and unsuitable for networks larger than a few thousand nodes. Thus, to produce so-
cial mappings of users to peers for the real graphs, we identified social communities with
the modified algorithm used in [KI11] (recursive-based Louvain method, Section 7.1.2),
for average community sizes of N=10, 50 and 100, while maintaining the replication fac-
tor to one (K=1). Table 4.1 presents a summary of these networks and the communities
found. We describe in more detail these networks and the community detection algorithm
in Section 7.1.
Table 4.1: Summary information of the real networks used in the experimental study for
the influence in Prometheus requests.
Network Users Edges
Communities (avg size N)
Source
N=10 N=50 N=100
Gnutella04 10,876 39,994 1,088 218 109 [RIF02]
Email-Enron 33,696 180,811 6,256 1,246 619 [Les12]
Gnutella31 62,561 147,878 3,370 674 337 [RIF02]
Epinions 75,877 405,739 7,564 1,485 727 [Les12]
Slashdot 82,168 504,230 8,207 1,607 794 [Les12]
Figure 4.5 plots the average influence of peers on the real graphs used. Figure 4.6 shows
the difference of the average influence between random and social mapping for the real
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Figure 4.5: Average peer influence for random and social mappings for real graphs, for
combinations of users per peer and number of hops per request. (Note: y-axis in log
scale).
graphs, for clarity. Figure 4.7 plots the CDFs of the average influence of peers. From
these results we formulate several lessons.
Lesson 2: Increased number of users per peer and decreased social graph size directly in-
crease peer influence on requests. The results on real graphs (Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7)
verify the intuition that more users mapped on a peer increase the peer’s influence on
requests, regardless of the type of mapping (random or social). However, the difference
between the two mappings (as seen in Figure 4.6) also increases with larger communi-
ties mapped on peers, as well as increased number of hops traversed. This means that
socially-aware mappings increase the peer influence in a smaller rate than random map-
pings, further supporting Lesson 1. Moreover, malicious peers are more effective in small
networks, since they can serve and thus influence a larger portion of requests. For exam-
ple, Gnutella04 exhibits a higher average influence than Gnutella31, which even though
has the same topological characteristics (as also seen by the peer influence profile in Fig-
ure 4.7), it’s 6 times larger in size and thus peers have less opportunity to serve (portions
of) requests.
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Figure 4.6: Average difference of peer influence between random and social mappings
for real graphs. I.e., difference between random and social mapping lines in Figure 4.5),
for combinations of users per peer and number of hops per request. (Note: y-axis in log
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Lesson 3: The topology of the social graph affects the peer influence. The size of the de-
centralized graph is not always an accurate predictor of the opportunity of peers to influ-
ence requests. It also depends on the particular application domain and topology of the
network. For example, Gnutella31 exhibits similar peer influence profile with Gnutella04,
even though it has overall lower absolute values due to its larger size (as explain in Les-
son 2). On the contrary, Gnutella31 is smaller in size than Slashdot and Epinions, and
yet exhibits overall lower peer influence as seen in the different peer influence profile in
Figure 4.7.
Lesson 4: The socially-aware distribution of a social graph onto peers allows the formation
of “hot-spot” peers. The maximum influence of each mapping is higher than its corre-
sponding average for all networks (synthetic or real), and all average community sizes N
and all n-hop requests. This reveals highly influential peers that control more requests
flowing through the P2P topology than the average peer. We especially notice these peers
for the social mapping of the small 1000-user graph. This is because users of high social
degree centrality are closely connected with each other and more likely to be mapped
together on the same peer [SBAG08] in the social than in the random mapping.
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Figure 4.7: CDF of average peer influence for random and social mappings for real
graphs, for combinations of users per peer and number of hops per request. (Note: axes
in log scale).
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Further, due to the small size of the graph, peers participate in more requests and the
variability of peer influence is higher (especially for 3 hop requests). These peers can
be identified based on the users mapped on them [KI11] and targeted for quarantine in
the early stages of a malware outburst or used to disseminate faster and more efficiently
security software patches to handle a malicious attack.
4.2.4 Peer Influence under Peer Collusion
In the third set of experiments we investigated the peer influence when peers collude with
each other, i.e., they are controlled by the same attacker. We used the largest network
slashdot and the social mappings created in the second experimental setup for average
community size of N=10 users per peer. The two collusion types examined where the
following: 1) a social-based collusion of neighboring peers (i.e., their mapped users are
connected with each other over social edges), 2) a random-based collusion of random
peers.
We seeded the collusion by selecting a random set of peers amounting to 1% of the total
peers in the system. Then, we iterated over these peers expanding their collusion set
depending on the type of collusion (social or random), until the overall malicious peers
across all collusion sets amounted to a specific portion of the total network. We varied
the overall fraction of peers colluding C in the range of 10% to 50% of the total peers.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 plot the average influence of peers when colluding in a social or ran-
dom way, respectively, to cover a portion C of the total number of peers in the system.
Figure 4.10 plots both types of collusion on the same graph for easier comparison (note
that peer influence is on the x-axis). We also compare average influence of the peers when
colluding or not colluding, when the social graph is distributed with a random or social
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Figure 4.8: Average peer influence for random (RM) and social mapping (SM) of the
slashdot network, for 10 users per peer and different number of hops per request. We
vary the percentage of social collusion (SC) and compare with the no-collusion (NC)
scenario. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals on reported average peer influence.
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vary the percentage of random collusion (RC) and compare with the no-collusion (NC)
scenario. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals on reported average peer influence.
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Figure 4.10: Average peer influence for random and social mapping of the slashdot
network, for 10 users per peer and different number of hops per request. We vary the
percentage of social and random collusion and compare with the no-collusion scenario.
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mapping and for neighborhood requests of different number of hops. From these results
we formulate several lessons.
Lesson 5: Peer collusion attacks are less effective on socially-aware mappings. Collusion
of peers into groups increases their individual effectiveness when attacking the system. As
seen from Figures 4.8, 4.9 and Figure 4.10, the average influence measured on collusion
groups (SC or RC) is always higher than the average influence of their individual peer
members when not colluding with each other (NC). However, a random distribution of
the social graph onto peers (RM) forces requests to access data from more peers than
in a social distribution (SM), and thus allows peers to control and influence a higher
portion of inference requests, either if they are colluding (SC and RC) or not colluding
(NC).
Lesson 6: Random peer collusions are less effective on socially-aware mappings. Gener-
ally, the average peer influence increases dramatically with the number of social hops
of the neighborhood request: from less than 0.1 for 2 hops to more than 0.9 for 4 hops
(as also shown in the previous two sets of experiments on the synthetic graph and real
graphs). In the social collusion SC, the attack targets neighboring peers (i.e., their users
are directly connected in the social graph). In this case, the attacker can achieve higher
peer influence on requests than if the attack targeted random peers (random collusion
RC). However, the difference between social and random collusion is limited to about
0.02 in 2 hop requests, increases to about 0.1 in 3 hop requests and decreases to about
0.05 in 4 hop requests.
Lesson 7: Network hops affect more the peer influence than collusion size. In either of
the two collusion types and graph mappings, increasing the number of colluding peers in-
creases the average peer influence of an attacker. However, the peer influence rate (change
of peer influence) depends more on the number of social hops the request will traverse
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the graph, than the size of the collusion set. Thus, we observe highest gains on the peer
influence rate for a malicious attacker at 3 social hop requests than 2 or 4 social hops.
4.3 Attacks at the Application Level
Prometheus exposes the social graph to applications and services via an API implement-
ing social inference functions. These inferences request access to users’ social data while
being executed on each peer and at each hop. Users in Prometheus can control access to
their social data via fine-grained ACPs.
Let us assume an honest user Bob who deploys a default policy allowing access to his
data only from his 1-hop (or direct) social neighborhood. Also assume a spammer Alice
who does not have a reciprocal edge from Bob to her. If Alice submits a n-hop neigh-
borhood request to Bob’s trusted peer to gain knowledge of his social relations within n
social hops and spam them, she will not be able to receive any data regarding Bob. Such
an ACP can protect Bob even in the case that his friends of friends’ accounts (i.e., 2-hops
from Bob) have been compromised by Alice. If Alice has a reciprocal edge from Bob to
her, Bob could modify his ACP to allow partial access to his data which are relevant to
the edge’s label, and only if the edge has a minimum weight w.
However, being very strict to protect a user’s data, such a draconian ACP comes with
an unwanted tradeoff as it limits Prometheus’ usability from applications seeking for
social data of individuals across multiple hops (≥ 2 hops). Therefore, honest users could
carefully relax their ACPs, allowing inference requests originating from users outside
their direct neighborhood to access portion of their social data only when the requests
are forwarded through specific trustworthy direct friends and their owned peers. Such
configuration allows the Prometheus service to become even more socially-aware, since
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these contacts acquire the role of gatekeeping the social data of their friends and protect
them from attacks.
In addition to applying defenses from the users’ side using ACPs, application designers
can make use of the Prometheus inference functions to reduce attacks on their users’
data. For example, a spammer Alice could use the neighborhood request to retrieve the
list of users within n hops from her and try to spam them with emails. An email applica-
tion could filter spam by allowing incoming emails only when the receiver is reciprocating
a social edge to the sender and with appropriate label and weight. Furthermore, the ap-
plication could use knowledge from the 2-hop neighborhood of the receiver to decide if
the incoming email is spam or not [GKF+06].
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Chapter 5: Projection Graphs 1
In a P2P system such as Prometheus, a social graph (SG) is decentralized among the
available peers in the system. This decentralization leads to the emergence of the pro-
jection graph (PG) [KI11]. In order to provide better intuition on the projection graph
formation, we present two application scenarios different than Prometheus (Section 5.1).
These scenarios, among others, motivate our study of the projection graph as a general
tool for improving application and system performance. We then present a formal model
for the projection graph that is used throughout the rest of this dissertation (Section 5.3).
5.1 Motivating Scenarios
People naturally form social communities with strong social bonds [WF94, FLGC02],
that could translate into incentives for resource sharing within the community [AG07,
IRSNF11]. In our study, we assume that there exists a community peer (e.g., provided by
a member of the social community) that stores the social data of all community members.
The projection graph emerges when the social data of all users in the graph are distributed
among the available peers in the system. We describe below two motivating scenarios of
social graph decentralization and the emergence of the projection graph. These scenarios
1Portions of this work have been previously published in [KI11] and are utilized with permission of the
publisher.
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help formally define the projection graph data structure and motivate the study of its
network properties and how they compare to the distributed social graph’s properties.
5.1.1 Civilian Networking in Large-Scale Disaster
After a natural disaster of large proportions, most of the communications and IT infras-
tructure is destroyed. Survivors cluster around small communities such as families, local
organizations and community centers in small villages, etc. To help with the dissemina-
tion of emergency information as well as the organization of search-and-rescue operations,
the authorities equip these communities with some basic IT and communication equip-
ment (e.g., commodity servers, GSM/Wifi networks).
Community members input on these machines (peers) their health status, as well as the
status (e.g., alive, injured, deceased or unknown) of their close family and friends living
with them or in close distance in the area of the disaster. This information represents the
edges of a social graph that connects users in the same geo-localized community. Individ-
uals may also input information about friends located in other communities along with
any useful detail regarding their status (e.g., last time seen, etc).
The community machines are connected with each other over wired and wireless networks
and form a rudimentary P2P network. In this way, a basic social network of civilians
is formed and their social information (along with others that might still be missing) is
stored on these machines in a decentralized fashion.
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5.1.2 Player Networking in Online Games
Online gaming platforms built for multi-player games (such as Steam [Val12], Battle-
field [Bat12] and Minecraft [Min12]) allow players from around the world to run servers
(peers) that host multi-player gaming sessions and individual players or teams can par-
ticipate in each session. Players typically choose a server as their favorite, due to low
network delays or the player community on the server.
Many of the in-game interactions and social interactions between players are stored on
the server as meta-game data. Occasionally, gamers play on different servers, for exam-
ple when their “home” server is oﬄine or overloaded. In this way, they also form social
connections with players from other communities. Consequently, the meta-gaming social
graph connecting players is distributed on thousands of gaming servers around the world.
5.2 Projection Graph Emergence
In both scenarios, a projection graph emerges when a social graph is partitioned into
social communities and distributed across the P2P network on community-owned peers.
Social edges connecting users of the same community remain within the community peer,
whereas social edges connecting users of different communities correspond to edges be-
tween peers in the projection graph.
In effect, peers acquire particular network properties in this graph based on the network
properties of the users storing their social data on them. But how do these network prop-
erties of the peers in the projection graph compare with the network properties of the
users in the social graph? And how can they be used to improve the performance of an
application traversing such a decentralized social graph? These questions motivate the
rest of this work.
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Figure 5.1: An example of a social graph distributed on a set of peers which are orga-
nized in a P2P overlay. Users A–O are shown in small grey circles, peers 1–5 are shown
in large blue circles in the PG and brown circles declare the peers organized in a P2P
overlay. Users are connected with social edges illustrated with black lines, blue lines
correspond to P2P edges with different weights (declared by their width) and red dashed
lines correspond to mappings of users onto peers storing their data. c©2011 IEEE.
5.3 Projection Graph Model
We consider a social graph as an undirected and unweighted graph SG = (VG, EG), where
VG is the set of users and EG ⊆ VG × VG is the set of edges that represent the social
ties between users (top layer of Figure 5.1). The existence of an (unweighted, undirected)
edge between two users u and v is denoted by e(u, v) = 1.
The projection graph in a P2P system emerges when the social graph is distributed on
the P2P network (middle layer of Figure 5.1). The projection graph is an undirected,
weighted graph whose nodes are peers responsible for a set of users in the social graph
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and whose edges represent the social ties between the users mapped on different peers.
We refer to a user u as “mapped” on a particular peer when the peer stores u’s social
data (the set of all social graph edges originating from u). The weight of an edge in the
projection graph is given by the number of social graph edges that connect the users
mapped on the end peers.
Formally, a projection graph is represented by PG=(VP , EP ). VP is the set of peers in the
P2P network. For each peer Pi∈VP , Qi is the set of users mapped on Pi. EP ⊆ VP ×VP is
the set of edges in the projection graph, to which we refer to as P2P edges. A P2P edge
between peers Pi and Pj , where i 6= j, is formally defined as follows:
(Pi, Pj) ∈ EP iff ∃u ∈ Qi, ∃v ∈ Qj , i 6= j s.t. (u, v) ∈ EG (5.1)
A P2P edge (Rij) represents the set of social edges between the users mapped on peer Pi
and the users mapped on peer Pj , or more formally,
Rij = {(u, v) ∈ EG|u ∈ Qi, v ∈ Qj , i 6= j} (5.2)
The weight of an edge between two peers Pi and Pj is denoted by e(Pi, Pj) = |Rij |, and
e(Pi, Pi) = 0 by definition.
Figure 5.1 presents a scenario in which users A–O store their data on peers 1–5, and each
peer has access to all its users’ data. The P2P edge R24 has the weight e(2, 4)=3 given by
the social edges (D,K), (D,L) and (D,M).
In this model, a user’s social data is stored on at least one peer, and each peer stores
at least one user’s social data. Each peer maintains the union of the social data of the
users mapped on it. Depending on the social relationship of these users, this union can be
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anywhere from a disjoint set of edges, as proposed in [BSVD09, SVCC09, CMS09], to a
connected subgraph, as proposed in [KFA+10a].
The projection graph is independent from the P2P overlay, as explained in the following
example. Assume an application wants to find the users in the 2-hop social neighborhood
of user G (i.e., friends and friends of friends). The application could search for these users
by traversing the graph over the social connections this user has with the rest of the users
(black arrows following social graph edges, top layer in Figure 5.1). Since the social graph
is distributed on top of a P2P network, these requests will be routed from peer to peer in
a manner informed by the topology of the social graph.
Therefore, the traversal of the social graph dictates peer 2 sending a message to peer 1
(blue arrow in the projection graph, middle layer in Figure 5.1) to request information
regarding the 1-hop connections of user B. This application request might translate into
multiple routing hops between the peers in the P2P communication overlay (e.g., DHT)
before the destination peer is located and the request is delivered (brown arrows in the
P2P overlay, bottom layer in Figure 5.1). We call such P2P systems socially-informed be-
cause the communication pattern between peers is determined by the social graph topol-
ogy and how it is projected on the peers, and can be seen independently of the P2P over-
lay.
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Chapter 6: Social Network Centrality Measures in Projection Graphs 1
In this Chapter, we formally define the degree centrality, node betweenness centrality and
edge betweenness centrality for a social graph and its corresponding projection graph.
These three classical social network centrality measures reveal many important social
properties of a network under study:
• Degree Centrality of a node quantifies its visibility to the rest of the network
and opportunity to influence and be influenced directly, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.1 (Section 6.1).
A
Figure 6.1: The degree centrality of user A is higher than other users in this example
social graph.
• Node Betweenness Centrality quantifies a node’s potential to control flows of
information between pairs of nodes connected in the network over indirect
paths, as shown in Figure 6.2 (Section 6.2).
1Portions of this work have been previously published in [KI11] and are utilized with permission of the
publisher.
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AFigure 6.2: The node betweenness centrality of user A is higher than other users in this
example social graph.
• Edge Betweenness Centrality quantifies an edge’s potential to control flows
of information between otherwise separate or distant parts of the network, as
shown in Figure 6.3 (Section 6.3).
BA
Figure 6.3: The edge betweenness centrality of the social edge connecting users A and B
is higher than other edges in this example social graph.
For each measure, we study the connection between the social and projection graph and
formulate research questions that we answer experimentally in the rest of this work. In
the following, we assume that multiple users can be mapped on the same peer and a user
can be mapped only on one peer.
6.1 Degree Centrality
The degree centrality [Nie74, Fre79] CD(n) of a node n in a graph is the number of edges
that n has with other nodes. The degree centrality of a user u mapped on peer Pi can
be expressed as the edges that u has with users on different peers than Pi, and the edges
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that u has with users mapped on the same peer Pi:
CD(u) =
∑
v∈Qj ,
Pj 6=Pi∈VP
e(u, v) +
∑
u6=v∈Qi
e(u, v),∀u ∈ Qi (6.1)
We can express the degree centrality of a peer Pi as a function of the sum of the degree
centralities of the users mapped on Pi, the sum of edges between users mapped on Pi and
the sum of edges between users of peers Pi and Pj ,∀Pj 6= Pi ∈ VP :
CD(Pi) =
∑
u∈Qi
CD(u)−
∑
u6=v∈Qi
e(u, v)−
∑
Pj 6=Pi∈VP
(
∑
u∈Qi
v∈Qj
e(u, v)− 1) (6.2)
Equation 6.2 allows us to analytically calculate the exact degree centrality of a peer if
the peer can access its users’ social connections and infer its P2P edges with other peers.
However, it is generally difficult to determine the exact degree centrality of a peer when
the peer is granted access to view only a user’s degree centrality score but not the user’s
connections. Thus, a research question is the following:
Question 1: Can a peer estimate its degree centrality in the projection graph based only
on the degree centrality score of its users in the social graph?
6.2 Node Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality [Ant71, Fre77] CNB(u) of a user u∈VG is the sum of fractions of
shortest paths between users s and t that pass through user u, denoted by σ(s, t|u), over
all the shortest paths between the two users, σ(s, t):
CNB(u) =
∑
s6=t∈VG
σ(s, t|u)
σ(s, t)
(6.3)
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Betweenness centrality CNB(Pi) of a peer Pi∈VP is the sum of fractions of weighted short-
est paths between peers Pj and Pk that pass through Pi, denoted by λ(Pj , Pk|Pi), over all
the weighted shortest paths between the two peers, λ(Pj , Pk):
CNB(Pi) =
∑
Pj 6=Pk∈VP
λ(Pj , Pk|Pi)
λ(Pj , Pk)
(6.4)
When users are mapped on peers, the shortest paths between the users can be expressed
as a combination of four basic categories, as illustrated in Figure 6.4. The first category
reflects the shortest paths between two users s and t that pass through u and each user
is mapped on a different peer. The second category (and its omitted symmetrical for
u∈PV (i), t∈PV (i), s∈PV (k)) reflects the shortest paths between s and t, when one of
them is mapped on the same peer as u. The third category reflects the shortest paths
between s and t when they are mapped on the same peer Pj , but different from u. The
forth category reflects the case that all three users are mapped on the same peer Pi.
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Figure 6.4: The four categories of shortest paths between two users s and t through u,
when users are mapped on peers. c©2011 IEEE.
Thus, we can express the betweenness centrality of user u∈Qi as a combination of these
main categories of shortest paths, as follows:
CNB(u) =
∑
Pj 6=Pk∈VP
( ∑
s∈Qj
t∈Qk
σ(s, t|u)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qi
t∈Qk
σ(s, t|u)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qj
t∈Qj
σ(s, t|u)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qi
t∈Qi
σ(s, t|u)
σ(s, t)
)
(6.5)
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As demonstrated in eq. 6.5, it is difficult to analytically determine the peer betweenness
centrality with respect to the centrality of its users due to the various types of shortest
paths in which users participate, which are highly dependent on the way the social graph
is decentralized onto peers. Also, the peer might not be granted access to traverse the
P2P topology and calculate its exact betweenness centrality in the projection graph, for
example due to user access policies on other peers or unavailability of peers. Assuming a
peer is granted access to its users’ betweenness centrality scores, a research question is:
Question 2: Can a peer estimate its node betweenness centrality in the projection graph,
based only on the node betweenness centrality score of its users in the social graph?
6.3 Edge Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality [GN02] CEB(e) of an edge e∈EG is the sum of fractions of shortest
paths between two users s and t that contain e, denoted by σ(s, t|e), over all the shortest
paths between the two users, σ(s, t), or more succinctly:
CEB(e) =
∑
s 6=t∈VG
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
(6.6)
Betweenness centrality CEB(E) of a P2P edge E∈EP is the sum of fractions of weighted
shortest paths between two peers Pi and Pj that contain E, denoted by λ(Pi, Pj |E), over
all weighted shortest paths between the two peers, λ(Pi, Pj):
CEB(E) =
∑
Pi 6=Pj∈VP
λ(Pi, Pj |E)
λ(Pi, Pj)
(6.7)
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As with the node betweenness, the shortest paths between users that contain edge e can
be divided into five categories, as illustrated in Figure 6.5. We omit the illustration of the
symmetrical cases for (a), (c) and (d).
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Figure 6.5: The five categories of shortest paths between two users s and t through e,
when users are mapped on peers. c©2011 IEEE.
Based on the intuition of Figure 6.5, we can express the betweenness centrality of an edge
e as follows:
CEB(e) =
∑
Pi 6=Pj∈VP
( ∑
s∈Qi
t∈Qj
e∈Rij
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qi
t∈Qi
e∈Rii
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qi
t∈Qj
e∈Rii
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qj
t∈Qj
e∈Rij
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
+
∑
s∈Qi
t∈Qi
e∈Rjj
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
)
(6.8)
Using similar argumentation with the node betweenness centrality, a research question is:
Question 3: Can we estimate the edge betweenness centrality of an edge in the projec-
tion graph based only on the edge betweenness centrality scores of its edges in the social
graph?
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Chapter 7: Experimental Study of Projection Graphs 1
In this Chapter we study the network centrality properties of the projection graphs. For
this, we construct in Section 7.1 projection graphs from real social networks by decentral-
izing them onto multiple peers using a social-based mapping. This mapping takes into
account the naturally formed communities of users and assigns one community per peer.
We study the centrality measures of the projection graphs formed and how they relate to
those of the social graphs distributed on peers (Section 7.2). Furthermore, we investigate
how well we can predict top centrality peers from top centrality users (Section 7.3).
7.1 Projection Graphs From Real Networks
In order to answer the research questions from Chapter 6, we used five real networks that
represent application domains where the social data of users is assumed to be distributed
on a P2P network, as proposed in Section 5.3. This assumption enables us to extract
projection graph topologies from these real networks, with varying number of users per
peer.
1Portions of these results have been previously published in [KI11] and are utilized with permission of
the publisher.
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7.1.1 Network Description
The five real networks used to generate projection graphs cover diverse domains, such as
file sharing (gnutella) (from [RIF02]), email communications of company employees (en-
ron), trust on consumer reviews (epinions) and friendships in a news website (slashdot)
(from [Les12]) and have sizes between 10K and 100K nodes.
The Email-Enron is an email communication network generated from emails sent within
the Enron company. Vertices are email addresses in the data set and undirected edges
represent at least one email exchange between the end vertices.
The P2P-Gnutella04 and P2P-Gnutella31 are two time-snapshots of the Gnutella peer-
to-peer file sharing network on August 4th and August 31st, 2002. Nodes represent hosts
in the Gnutella network topology and edges represent connections between the Gnutella
hosts. Even though the Gnutella networks are not social networks like the other three,
we use them because they exhibit social properties [RIF02] and we have two instances of
different sizes, enabling us to study the variation of the social network metrics with the
network size.
The Soc-Epinions1 is a who-trusts-whom online social network of the general consumer
review site “Epinions.com”. Members of the site can decide whether to “trust” each other.
Nodes represent the members and edges represent the trust relationships among mem-
bers. All the trust relationships interact and form the “Web of Trust,” which is then
combined with review ratings to determine which reviews are shown to the user.
The Soc-Slashdot0922 is a network containing friend/foe links between users of “Slash-
dot.org”, a user-contributed, technology-related news website. Users can tag each other as
friends or foes using the “Slashdot Zoo” feature.
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We consider all networks undirected and unweighted and used only the largest connected
component (LCC) from each graph to ensure reachability between all pairs of users and
peers. Table 7.1 presents a summary of the networks’ size with respect to the full network
and the largest connected component found.
Table 7.1: Summary information of the real networks used in the projection graph
experimental study. c©2011 IEEE.
Network (abbreviation) Number of Users Number of Edges Source
LCC (original) LCC (original)
P2P-Gnutella04 (gnutella04) 10,876 (10,876) 39,994 (39,994) [RIF02]
Email-Enron (enron) 33,696 (36,692) 180,811 (183,831) [Les12]
P2P-Gnutella31 (gnutella31) 62,561 (62,586) 147,878 (147,892) [RIF02]
Soc-Epinions1 (epinions) 75,877 (75,879) 405,739 (405,740) [Les12]
Soc-Slashdot0922 (slashdot) 82,168 (82,168) 504,230 (504,230) [Les12]
7.1.2 Mapping Users onto Peers
To study the properties of projection graphs, we first identified social communities on
each social graph and then mapped each community to a peer. Social edges between com-
munities were transformed into weighted P2P edges. Communities were identified by us-
ing a modified algorithm of the Louvain method [BGLL08] for fast community detection
in large networks.
This method first splits users into very small communities, and then iteratively reassigns
users to other communities and merges them in order to improve the overall modularity
score. It stops this process when the modularity score doesn’t improve between two con-
secutive iterations.
The modularity Q [NG04] of a partition in a graph measures the density of the links
inside communities as compared to links between communities, and is defined as follows:
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Q =
1
2m
∑
i,j
[
Aij − kikj
2m
]
δ(ci, cj) (7.1)
where Aij represents the weight of the edge between users i and j, ki =
∑
j Aij is the
sum of the weights of the edges attached to vertex i, ci is the community to which vertex
i is assigned, the δ-function δ(u, v) is 1 if u = v and 0 otherwise and m = 12
∑
ij Aij .
The value of the modularity lies in the range [−1, 1]. It is positive if the number of edges
within groups exceeds the number expected on the basis of chance.
The Louvain method detects communities very fast, even for graph sizes in the order of
millions of users, with a very wide range of community sizes, i.e., a lot of small groups
of 2–10 users, as well as very large groups in the order of 1000s users. The largest com-
munity usually represents the core of the network whereas the smallest ones, loosely con-
nected to the core, reflect the whiskers of the network [LLDM08]. Instead, we would like
to have communities with a size in a realistic range, avoiding these large outliers and
reducing bias on the calculation of social network properties of the P2P topologies.
One way to split these large communities is to modify the Louvain method to reassign
users to communities only if the resulting communities are below a max-size. However,
this option interferes with the way the Louvain method works, and prohibits the modu-
larity from reaching the best possible value. An alternative way is to consider the com-
munities exceeding the max-size as individual subgraphs and recursively call the Lou-
vain method on these subgraphs. We call this the ”Recursive-Louvain” method. Even
though this method also partitions the graph into communities which lead to sub-optimal
overall modularity score, it allows for the optimal modularity to be reached within sub-
communities.
We tested the Recursive-Louvain method with values for the max-size=10, 100, 500, 1000
and decided to use max-size=100 as it offered a local minimum for the standard deviation
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of size of communities. The value of max-size=100 supports the findings in [LLDM08]
which found that the best communities with respect to conductance are relatively small
with sizes up to 100 users per community.
Since we consider that a community is mapped on a peer contributed by a user, it would
be unrealistic to map a very large community on one peer. Thus, we consider the com-
munities exceeding a max-size as individual subgraphs and recursively apply the Louvain
method on these subgraphs. We call this technique “Recursive-Louvain” and tested it
with values for the max-size=10, 100, 500 and 1000. We used max-size=100 as it offered
a local minimum for the standard deviation of size of communities. The value of max-
size=100 supports the findings in [LLDM08] according to which the best communities
with respect to conductance are relatively small, with sizes up to 100 users per commu-
nity.
We compare in Table 7.2 the summary statistics of the formed communities with the
Louvain and Recursive-Louvain methods for max-size=100. Using the Recursive-Louvain
method we successfully split most of the larger communities into smaller ones (4 to 50
times smaller) and improve the overall standard deviation of the size of communities
formed from each network (some cases 6 to 30 times smaller).
Table 7.2: Summary statistics for communities identified with the Louvain (L) and
Recursive-Louvain (RL) methods on the real networks used. c©2011 IEEE.
Social Number of Standard Min/Max
Network Communities |Qi| Deviation
L / RL L / RL L / RL L (RL Max)
gnutella04 2384/3013 4.0/3.6 23.0/3.5 2/1299 (89)
enron 2434/4303 11.9/7.6 139.1/15.7 2/4845 (1204)
gnutella31 13425/14385 4.4/4.3 3.0/2.8 2/3594 (97)
epinions 8481/16404 7.1/4.6 196.4/7.9 2/15770 (484)
slashdot 6879/18846 9.5/4.3 225.2/6.9 2/17012 (358)
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This process effectively reduces the variability of the community size. However, if we take
into account the new maximum sizes, the range is still reasonably large: communities
with size of more than 400 users are still available and could reflect a large group of users
utilizing the same computing resources (e.g., a highly populated gaming server). At the
same time, the minimum and average community size remains either constant or within
the same order of magnitude, for all social networks. This is a clear indication that the
Recursive-Louvain method successfully reduces the number of outlier large communities
without affecting the overall variability of the community size.
7.1.3 Community Size and Degree Variability
In our study, we investigate how the average number of users mapped per peer affects the
estimation of the three social network measures, while using only local information on
peers and P2P edges. Thus, we vary the average size of communities mapped on peers.
Using the Recursive-Louvain method we identified a set of communities with fairly small
average size (about 4–5 users), which were used as a baseline for our experimentation
with increasing average size of communities.
To produce communities with increasing number of users, we incrementally merged the
smallest, socially-connected communities, until we reached the desired average number of
users per community (and thus peer) in the range of 10, 20, ..., 1000 users/peer. During
this process, a lot of very small communities of 2-5 users were gradually merged to form
larger communities of average size in the range of 10, 20, ..., 1000 users per peer. This
merging process finds support from [LLDM08] where it is suggested that small commu-
nities can be combined into meaningful larger ones.
In order to avoid the case of a small community merging with an already large commu-
nity, we enforced that the communities to be merged, as well as the newly formed merged
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community, cannot be larger than the max-size of users. The parameter max-size was
gradually increased as the average size of users per peer increased, to allow for larger
average size of communities.
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of the community size rank vs frequency observed in the different
average size of communities and different real networks. c©2011 IEEE.
Figure 7.1 presents the rank distribution of the size of communities formed by this pro-
cess, for the five networks studied and for various average community sizes, ranging from
5 to 1000 users/peer. The average community size for all networks for the range of 5–100
users/peer exhibits a Zipf distribution with two main exponents. The first one describes
the size of community among the top 10 ranked sizes. The second one describes the rest
of the sizes ranking lower. The Zipf distribution applicable in this range of community
sizes shows that the communities formed maintain a power-law structure [CNM04]. When
the average community size is increased above 100–200 users/peer, the Zipf distribution
is no longer applicable, as the communities become more uniform.
Figure 7.2 presents the rank distribution of the peer degree in the projection graph for
different average size of community, for each of the five networks examined. The user
degree rankings of the networks (points marked as “1”) follow a Zipf distribution demon-
strating a power-law nature (especially the larger networks epinions and slashdot).
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of the peer degree rank vs frequency observed in the different
average size of communities and different real networks. c©2011 IEEE.
Similar to the community size rankings, the networks exhibit a strong 2-exponent Zipf
distribution when the size of communities increases from 5 to about 20–50 users per peer,
meaning that the topologies inherit social structure from the social graph distributed on
the peers. Beyond a community size of about 100 users, the topology becomes signifi-
cantly uniform: most peers exhibit a similar degree, thus degree rankings show similar
frequency. This means they all have about the same number of connections and they
form tightly connected groups or cliques. This effect intensifies as the average community
size increases to 1000 users per peer.
7.2 Centrality Measures in Social vs. Projection Graph
As demonstrated by the expressions in Chapter 6, it is not easy to answer analytically the
questions stated because of the various terms intercorrelated in the calculation of each
centrality metric and the way users are mapped on peers.
In this section we experimentally examine how each of the three centrality metrics for a
peer depends on the number of users mapped on the peer and how it correlates and if
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it can be estimated by their cumulative centrality metric. We study these associations
on the five real graphs and their extracted topologies, as explained in Section 7.1. In
particular, we are interested to identify within what range of number of users per peer
this estimation maintains high accuracy.
7.2.1 Estimation of Centrality Measures
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Figure 7.3: Correlation of cumulative normalized centrality scores of users vs normalized
centrality scores of peers for Degree, Node Betweenness and Edge Betweenness Centrality.
c©2011 IEEE.
Figure 7.3 presents for each metric the Pearson correlation of the scores of peers and
cumulative scores of users per peer, with respect to the average number of users per peer.
Specifically, we calculate the correlation for each metric based on the tuple {A,B} of
scores per peer (or edge): (A) the cumulative centrality of users (or social edges) mapped
on a peer Pi (or P2P edge Rij), and (B) the centrality of the corresponding peer Pi (or
P2P edge Rij) in the resulting topology. More concisely,
Degree Centrality: {
∑
u∈Qi
CD(u), CD(Pi)} (7.2)
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Node Betweenness Centrality: {
∑
u∈Qi
CNB(u), CNB(Pi)} (7.3)
Edge Betweenness Centrality: {
∑
e∈Rij
CEB(e), CEB(Rij)} (7.4)
The correlation is calculated by taking into account the tuples across all peers (or P2P
edges) in the network, given a particular ratio of users per peer.
We observe that, for most of the networks, the correlation of the degree and node be-
tweenness centrality remains fairly steady and high overall (> 0.8) for communities of
less than 100-200 users. From that point on, the correlation decreases rapidly. This trend
is generally consistent across all sizes and types of real graphs, but some networks present
an outlier behavior.
For degree centrality, gnutella31 maintains a high correlation up to 300 users/peer before
the steep drop. For node betweenness centrality, the two gnutella networks demonstrate
some extended high correlation up to 300 users/peer. The edge betweenness centrality
drops significantly with the increase in community size, demonstrating that it is more
sensitive to this parameter than the degree or node betweenness centrality. Next, we elab-
orate on the details behind the correlation performance of each centrality metric.
Figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 compare the average degree centrality (DCP), node betweenness
centrality (NBCP) and edge betweenness centrality (EBCP) for peers, with the respective
cumulative centrality metric for users mapped on peers, respectively. Figures 7.4 and 7.5
show that the degree and node betweenness centrality of peers increase with respect to
the average size of community.
This means that adding more users to a peer directly affects the centrality of the corre-
sponding peer according to these metrics. We explain this as follows: by increasing the
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of cumulative normalized scores of users (point lines) vs average
normalized scores of peers (smoothed lines) for Degree Centrality. c©2011 IEEE.
size of the communities, we reduce their number. In effect, more users mapped on a peer
translates to more social edges with new peers, thus possible more P2P edges to other
peers (i.e., higher degree centrality), as well as opportunity of the peer to participate in
more shortest paths (i.e., higher betweenness centrality).
Figure 7.6 shows that the cumulative edge betweenness centrality of social edges between
peers does not change for a range of size of communities. This is because when increasing
the community size from 1 to about 50 users per peer, more social edges are mapped
within the peers instead of between peers (as demonstrated in Figure 7.7). Within this
range, the weighted edge betweenness centrality of the P2P edges decreases: the number
of peers is reduced, and new edges between peers distribute the betweenness centrality of
P2P edges across multiple paths, thus the P2P edges lose importance (in terms of edge
betweenness).
As the number of users mapped on the same peer increases, the degree and node be-
tweenness centrality of peers reach a maximum point. For the degree centrality this can
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be seen at the point where the slope is steepest (e.g., the gnutella04 topology reaches
a maximum average degree centrality at about 55 users per peer, whereas the slashdot
topology at about 90 users per peer). From equation 6.2, when the average size of com-
munity per peer |Qi| increases, the second and third terms increase as well but at a differ-
ent rate than the first term, thus the difference of them becomes least at this maximum
point.
At this point, the network is optimally divided in communities mapped on peers which
exhibit highest average degree and node betweenness centrality. For the edge between-
ness, this is a turning point: between 50 and 100 users per peer, more social edges are
mapped on P2P edges (i.e., between peers), in effect reversing the decline observed in
Figure 7.6.
Increasing further the average community size decreases rapidly the peer degree centrality
to very small values (also verified by the flat distribution of peer degrees in Figure 7.2).
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In addition, the opportunity to influence information flows (due to high node between-
ness) is distributed uniformly across all peers since they start forming a small, tightly
connected graph. For the smallest network gnutella04, this drop takes effect quickly at
about 60 users per peer, whereas for larger networks, like epinions and slashdot, at about
200–500 users per peer.
At the same time, even though the betweenness centrality of P2P edges increases, the
opportunity to influence information flows (due to high edge betweenness) is distributed
evenly across very few P2P edges. Eventually, by increasing even further the commu-
nity size, the peer degree reaches 0, since at that point all the users are mapped on one
peer and this peer has no inter-peer edges. It is important to note that depending on
the application domain, the network properties of the topology may vary, even for seem-
ingly small networks such as the enron email graph in comparison to slashdot or epinions
graphs.
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Figures 7.4– 7.6 help explain the correlation performance of Figure 7.3. Up to the max-
imum point for degree and betweenness centrality, the values of each pair of metrics in-
crease with the addition of more users on each peer, and thus, the correlation is high
overall. After this point, there is rapid decrease in the centrality scores of peers but not
for the cumulative scores of users, and this reverse relationship causes the steep drop
in the correlation of the respective measures. For the edge betweenness, the correlation
drops early, as there is a high deviation between the P2P and social edge betweenness
centrality scores (as explained earlier).
7.2.2 Applicability of Results
From our experiments on these networks we formulate the following lessons on peer cen-
trality in projection graphs.
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Lesson 1: Increasing the community size directly effects the centrality of peers. The in-
crease of the average community size has an immediate effect on the topology and thus
on the social network measures of each peer. From our experiments we identify a turning
point where the degree and node betweenness centralities of peers reach a maximum.
Before this point is reached, the projection graph resembles more closely the social graph
it projects. Thus, the correlation of social network metrics between users and peers is
highest and the two measures for peers can be estimated with good accuracy by the cu-
mulative scores of users. When this point is reached, the peers gain maximum oppor-
tunity to influence the information flows passing through them. After this point, the
topology loses any social properties, becomes a highly connected network and the peers
acquire equal opportunity to participate in social graph traversals.
Lesson 2: The cumulative centrality of users mapped on a peer can be used to estimate the
peer’s centrality. Users mapped on a peer reflect their importance in the social graph onto
their peer in the projection graph topology in two ways: either directly by connecting
their peer with other peers (degree centrality), or indirectly by situating their peer on
multiple shortest paths between other peers (betweenness centrality).
For small and medium size communities, we observe high correlation between users and
peers for both of these centrality metrics. Thus, the centrality scores of users acquired
from local information available to peers are good predictors of the importance a peer
will have in the network. In effect, this means a peer can estimate with high accuracy its
importance in the projection graph without the need to traverse the P2P network, which
might be difficult due to network size, peer churn and user data access policies on other
peers.
Lesson 3: The cumulative centrality of social edges between two peers is not a good es-
timator for the centrality of their P2P edge. There are high betweenness social edges in
the social graph that control significant information flow between different parts of the
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network. However, the importance of a social edge reflected on the P2P network depends
on the way the social edges are mapped in the topology. From our experiments we ob-
serve that when more social edges are mapped within peers instead of between peers, the
importance of social edges between peers becomes less significant and the estimation of
edge betweenness centrality of P2P edges is less accurate.
7.3 Estimating Top Centrality Scoring Peers
In very large social networks, calculating the exact node betweenness centrality of users
can be intractable. Instead, we could use approximate measures such as κ–path central-
ity [ATK+11, KAS+12], to identify a small percentage of users that exhibit high between-
ness in the social graph.
Next, we experimentally study if we can identify peers that exhibit high centrality in the
projection graph, given a set of users with relatively high degree or node betweenness
centrality in the social graph. We investigate this proposal with two methods on the pro-
jection graphs constructed from the real networks.
In the first method, we pick users in top-N% centrality (degree/betweenness), and create
a unique set U of their peers (set U , size k=|U |). Then, we pick k peers with the highest
centrality (set P , size k=|P |). Finally, we compare the sets U and P to find the overlap
of same peers.
In the second method, we pick communities in top-N% cumulative score of centrality
(degree/betweenness), and create a set C of their peers (set C, size q=|C|). Then, we
pick peers in top-N% centrality (set P , size q=|P |). Finally, we compare the sets C and
P to find the overlap of same peers.
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Figure 7.8 shows for all the networks used the percent overlap of peers for the degree
centrality using the two methods described. We repeated the same experiments for the
node betweenness centrality and report in Figure 7.9 the percent overlap of peers for the
node betweenness.
The results for the degree centrality are very similar to the node betweenness centrality
for all networks and for both methods. We attribute this to the high correlation between
the two metrics, which is common in social networks. Depending on the network, using
the first method and top-5% of users, we can achieve 60–100% accuracy in identifying
important peers for communities which are within the range of 5–100 users per peer.
Above this range, the projection graph topology becomes too densely connected and the
centrality of peers is uniformly distributed across a small number of peers.
Also, users of high importance are usually socially close to each other [SBAG08] and since
the first method identifies only those users, there is a higher probability these users are
mapped together on just a handful of peers. The overlap shows we can accurately predict
the corresponding top peers within a range of users per peer.
The second method achieves high accuracy but for a tighter range of users per peer. In
comparison to the first method, the second method degrades in performance when in-
creasing the community size. This means the cumulative score of users is more sensitive
to the size of grouping of users per peer than the individual scores of users.
From these experiments we formulate the following lesson. Top degree or betweenness
centrality peers affect system performance and security. However, deterministically iden-
tifying high betweenness peers in projection graphs is infeasible not only because of the
networks’ large scales but also because of their dynamic nature caused by high peer churn.
Our experiments show we can identify with high accuracy the peers with high degree or
betweenness centrality, by knowing the top 5% degree or betweenness centrality users in
the social graph.
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Figure 7.8: Percent overlap of peers for top N% degree centrality in the networks used.
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Figure 7.9: Percent overlap of peers for top N% node betweenness centrality in the
networks used.
118
Chapter 8: Leveraging the Projection Graph in Application and System
Design
Previous studies have used centrality of nodes in social graphs to improve performance
of applications such as search [ALPH01] or dissemination of software patches for worm
containment in social networks [ZCZ+09, NXT10]. We propose that projection graph cen-
trality properties (either estimated as proposed earlier, or calculated exactly) can also be
used to improve performance of applications such as social data search or dissemination
of emergency messages. In the following sections, we focus on social data search.
We study two different search workloads (Section 8.1) and investigate techniques that use
the projection graph model and its centrality properties at the application level (Sec-
tion 8.2), and the overlay level (Section 8.3) for improved performance. We summarize
our findings in a set of lessons (Section 8.4).
8.1 Application Workloads and Experimental Setup
In this Section we describe two applications inspired from the motivating scenarios pre-
sented earlier in Section 5.1. These applications are focused on social data search and
impose two different search workloads in the P2P system. We further describe the details
of the experimental setup used by the next two sections.
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8.1.1 Application Workloads
The first application is person-finder: the relatives of a missing person in the disaster
search the civilian network distributed on the P2P network. Social information is highly
geo-localized in the system. The search could start from a remote node close to the last
known location of the missing person. The search traverses the social graph to find time-
relevant information about this person, either stored by him or by others. Many commu-
nity peers could be potentially visited before any information about the person is found.
A smart search technique should strive to limit the peers visited and thus the overall
communication in the system, while maximizing the success rate.
The second application is team-builder in online gaming, a service that builds teams by
matching players based on their gaming characteristics such as play statistics or level of
experience. Server administrators occasionally instantiate such a service for competitions
or simply for increased fun. Such a service aims to find D players from at least
√
D dis-
tinct communities (for diversity in playing style) in order to form N teams with C players
each (D=CxN). The service traverses the meta-gaming social graph in search for the
right combination of players, potentially visiting hundreds of servers, with each server
storing data of tens to hundreds of players.
These two applications represent the following search workloads: a) Starting from a ran-
dom user s in the social graph, find a specific user d. b) Starting from a random user s in
the social graph, find any D users from
√
D different communities.
8.1.2 Experimental Setup
For these experiments we used the two largest graphs, slashdot and gnutella31. Slashdot
has about double the graph density than that of gnutella31, which leads to shorter aver-
120
age path lengths (4.07 vs. 5.94 hops). We constructed their projection graphs considering
communities of about five users (a typical family server) with maximum sizes of 358 and
97 users for slashdot and gnutella31 respectively (closer to gaming server size). This
average size also offers the best estimation of peer centrality from the cumulative scores
of users, while allowing the formation of large-scale peer networks (> 10K peers).
We performed the person-finder search for a number S of different pairs of source and
destination users. This number was set to 10% of the whole social graph (i.e. S = 8216
pairs for slashdot and S = 6256 pairs for the gnutella31). We performed the team-
builder search for the same number of starting users S.
D was set to 1% of the users of each social graph, to force search queries to traverse each
social graph for more than 2 social hops (i.e., to visit at least the friends of friends of a
source user): on average, for ∼4 (∼2.5) hops for gnutella31 (slashdot), with user average
degree 4.7 (13.2).
We did not apply any constraints on the number of hops traveled from the source user, to
study the highest possible success rate with respect to the incurred communication cost.
However, we maintained the history of the previously visited users/peers and stopped the
search when either the search goal had been met, or all neighboring users/peers had been
visited. We measured the query success rate, the number of social graph and projection
graph hops traversed, and the percentage of system peers accessed (P2P communication
overhead).
8.2 Leveraging the Projection Graph at the Application Level
In the first approach, we inform the search not only with social graph topology prop-
erties [ALPH01], but also with projection graph properties which peers acquire within
the system. The intuition is that a search query should be forwarded to users who being
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mapped on central peers are likely to be connected to other central users mapped on the
same central peers [SBAG08], and this should lead to improved search performance. In
this section we investigate how the projection graph properties can inform various social
search techniques to increase the success rate and reduce overhead.
8.2.1 Social Search Techniques
We investigate the following four search techniques for traversing the social graph. The
first three techniques assume that during the social graph traversal, a user forwards the
search query to its neighboring users mapped on peers with 1) degree centrality in the
topN% of neighboring peers, 2) betweenness centrality in the top N% of neighboring
peers, or 3) to neighboring users whose peers connect over projection graph edges with
betweenness centrality in the top N% of neighboring projection graph edges. These tech-
niques allow an application to utilize peer centrality to inform its graph traversal when
specific user centrality is not available (e.g., due to privacy settings).
We compare their performance with a baseline technique (4) which even though still uti-
lizes the same social graph topology, it does not take into account projection graph topol-
ogy properties but randomly selects the same number N of neighboring users to forward
the query. We also investigated the same techniques using centrality calculated in the
social graph, but we exclude these results for brevity of discussion, as they show similar
performance to the projection graph centrality techniques. We tested all the above tech-
niques for N=20 and N=50.
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Figure 8.1: CDF of the number of social graph hops for successful queries in social graph
traversals. This is the success rate for successful person-finder and team-builder queries
in the social graph, for different search techniques and portion of edges used, for the
networks gnutella31 (62561 nodes, 147878 edges) and slashdot (82168 nodes, 504230
edges).
8.2.2 Experimental Results
Figure 8.1 presents the success rate of the person-finder and team-builder searches as
a function of the number of SG hops traversed for the four search techniques. For the
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person-finder search over the gnutella31 (slashdot) network, all techniques converge to
a maximum of about 55% (65%) of query success rate when 50% of social edges are used
and about 17% (30%) when 20% of social edges are used.
For the gnutella31 (slashdot) network, we notice that more than 50% of the queries fin-
ish within 7 (3) hops when centrality techniques are used in comparison to about 9 (4.5)
hops for the random technique. Thus, even though the random technique uses the same
number of edges on the same graph as the centrality techniques, the random selection
of which edges to follow in the search leads to longer walks on the SG and lower success
rates.
Note that while traditional DHTs are better at finding “the needle in the haystack”, they
are impractical in this application scenario for the following reasons. First, identical names
can exist within the same geographical region (and even the same family) and thus ambi-
guity can be introduced as to which person’s social data were returned. Second, DHTs do
not easily exploit the geographic locality implicit to this search type, which has to follow
the social graph edges within each community and geographic location to find the correct
person from the appropriate community.
In comparison to the person-finder search, the overall success rates reported for team-
builder search are 5–10% higher, with the queries finishing within shorter walks. This is
expected as the team-builder search is satisfied with any users discovered in the social
neighborhood of the randomly selected source, given they come from
√
N different com-
munities, as opposed to finding a specific user. We notice that within 4 (2) social graph
hops in gnutella31 (slashdot), more than 50% (60%) of the queries finish using centrality
techniques, whereas only about 20% (15%) using the random technique.
Figure 8.2 shows the overhead as the percentage of peers accessed. We compare the ran-
dom technique only with the topN% peer degree centrality technique as the other cen-
trality techniques perform similarly in success rate. The person-finder search on both
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Figure 8.2: CDF of the percentage of peers accessed in the system in social graph
traversals. This percentage means system overhead of successful person-finder and
team-builder queries in the social graph, for different search techniques and portion of
edges used, for the networks gnutella31 (62561 nodes, 147878 edges) and slashdot (82168
nodes, 504230 edges).
networks has a similar overhead in both types of techniques, especially when using 50% of
edges. However, the team-builder search with the centrality technique has 0.25–2 times
less overhead than the random technique.
As mentioned in the beginning, in addition to the experiments using projection graph
properties, we tested techniques that used the centrality properties in the social graph
(not shown here for brevity). These experiments showed that the centrality techniques
that use social graph centrality scores perform similarly with the centrality techniques
that use projection graph centrality scores. This observation was true when using degree
centrality or node betweenness centrality.
125
This can be attributed to the high correlation between user and peer scores for the same
centrality measure: correlation 0.9–0.95 (0.8–0.9) between degree (node betweenness)
centrality of users and peers, as well as between different centrality measures: correlation
0.85–0.91 (0.71–0.85) between degree and node betweenness centrality of users (peers).
Furthermore, global metrics that require knowledge of the whole social or projection graph,
such as node betweenness, do not add much gain in the search performance, so an appli-
cation can effectively use local information instead, such as degree centrality.
8.3 Leveraging the Projection Graph at the P2P Overlay Level
A P2P system could be organized into either an unstructured overlay (e.g., Gnutella) or
a structured overlay (e.g., a DHT). Leveraging social graph knowledge has been applied
to both structured [MGGM04] and unstructured [PCT04] P2P overlays. In this section
we investigate the benefits of informing routing decisions in the P2P network with PG-
specific information. We focus on unstructured overlays, leaving the structured overlays
for future work.
8.3.1 PG-Based Unstructured P2P Overlays
By definition, a projection graph is the accurate representation of the social graph mapped
on the P2P system. We propose an unstructured P2P overlay that exactly mimics the
projection graph: the routing tables in the P2P network consist of (a subset of) the pro-
jection graph edges that connect different peers. This overlay reflects well the social rela-
tionships between users (thus best supporting socially-aware applications), and, implicitly
encapsulates geographical (and network) locality and clustering, since social relationships
are usually geographically close [SNLM11].
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However, the power-law nature of the node degree in the projection graph translates into
high-degree peers maintaining unrealistically many connections. Therefore, we propose
that the projection graph edges (EP ) are considered as potential communication connec-
tions between peers in the overlay, but only some of them are implemented into active
communication connections (EA), i.e., EA ⊆ EP .
We investigate the same four techniques but this time in overlay routing. In the first
three techniques, a peer forwards the search query to its neighboring peers with 1) de-
gree centrality in the topN% of the neighboring peers (set D), 2) betweenness centrality
in the topN% of the neighboring peers (set B), or 3) that are connected over projec-
tion graph edges with betweenness centrality in the topN% of the neighboring projection
graph edges (set E). The fourth technique is for baseline comparison: a peer forwards
the query in the projection graph topology to the same number N of randomly selected
neighboring peers (set R, |R|=|D|).
The difference from the application-level techniques (Section 8.2.1) is that a search query
traverses the projection graph instead of the social graph. Thus, instead of forwarding a
message along social graph edges and potentially bouncing multiple times between the
same peers, the message is forwarded along the projection graph edges and thus reducing
redundant communication.
To apply these techniques, the following assumptions are made: First, a query can access
all user data stored on a peer. Second, as in all P2P systems, peers regularly update in-
formation regarding peers in their routing table, such as availability, but also PG-based
centrality metrics. Third, peers rank their neighbors based on the projection graph met-
rics, and depending on the heuristic applied, they select the topN% subset as their active
connections.
Therefore, depending on the search technique used (t=1,. . . ,4), an active connection be-
tween two peers Pi and Pj will be included in the set of active connections of Pi (set E
Pi
A )
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and can be defined as follows:
(Pi, Pj) ∈ EPiA iff ∃Pi ∈ VP , ∃Pj ∈ VP s.t.
(Pi, Pj) ∈ EP and

Pj ∈ D if t = 1
Pj ∈ B if t = 2
(Pi, Pj) ∈ E if t = 3
Pj ∈ R if t = 4
(8.1)
Consequently, the total set of active connections in the P2P network EA is the union of
the sets EPiA for all peers:
EA =
⋃
∀Pi∈VP
EPiA (8.2)
8.3.2 Experimental Results
We tested the four techniques by varying N%, the portion of edges used. Since the search
query has access to all the users’ data stored on a particular peer, we expected the search
to finish with higher success rate and in shorter walks than when the search traversed the
social graph edges (Section 8.2).
By varying the portion of edges used from 1% to 50%, our experiments (not shown here
for brevity) revealed that using ∼20% of available projection graph edges leads to almost
maximum success rate for both person-finder and team-builder searches; above 20%
there is mostly increase in the message overhead with minor gains in success rate. Using
below 10% of projection graph edges leads to low search performance for both search
types regardless of the technique used, but with the random technique performing the
poorest. Next, we compare the techniques using 10% and 20% of PG edges.
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Figure 8.3: CDF of the number of projection graph hops for successful queries in
projection graph traversals. This is the success rate for successful person-finder and
team-builder queries in the social graph, for different search techniques and portion of
edges used, for the networks gnutella31 (62561 nodes, 147878 edges) and slashdot (82168
nodes, 504230 edges).
Figure 8.3 presents the success rate of the person-finder and team-builder searches as
a function of the number of projection graph hops. For the person-finder search and
the gnutella31 (slashdot) network, all techniques converge to a maximum of about 98%
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Figure 8.4: CDF of the percentage of peers accessed in the system in projection graph
traversals. This percentage means system overhead of successful person-finder and
team-builder queries in the projection graph, for different search techniques and portion
of edges used, for the networks gnutella31 (62561 nodes, 147878 edges) and slashdot
(82168 nodes, 504230 edges). Note the x-axis in log scale.
(87%) of query success rate when 20% of projection graph edges are used and about 64%
(78%) when 10% of projection graph edges are used.
A centrality technique with 20% projection graph edges has 20% more success within 2
P2P hops than using the random technique. This difference is amplified for the gnutella31
network, where within 5 hops the centrality techniques achieve over 60% more success
than the random technique. For the team-builder search, similar maximum success rates
with the person-finder search are reported for both networks, but with the queries fin-
ishing in shorter walks by 3 (2) fewer P2P hops for the gnutella31 (slashdot) network.
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The gain in success rate and with fewer P2P hops is reflected on the system overhead
presented in Figure 8.4 as the percentage of peers accessed. We compare the random
technique only with the topN% peer degree centrality technique, as the other centrality
techniques perform similarly in success rate. Overall, the centrality technique leads to
similar or lower system overhead than the random technique. The person-finder search
has a similar overhead in both techniques, especially when 20% of edges are used: up to
76% (99.4%) of peers were accessed in gnutella31 (slashdot) to reach maximum possible
success rate.
For the team-builder search, the random technique has about 3–4 times more overhead
than the centrality technique, due to longer walks in the projection graph (as seen in
Figure 8.3). Thus, the technique needs to access a larger portion of peers to satisfy the
team-builder queries.
8.4 Applicability of Results
The previous experimental results on social search from both the application layer and
the P2P overlay layer allow us to formulate the following lessons.
Lesson 1: The centrality techniques lead to higher success rates within fewer hops (in the
social or projection graph) than the random technique. In particular, we observe that
even though the random technique is also socially-aware as it utilizes the same social and
projection graph topology construction as the centrality techniques (but randomly selects
to which users or peers to send the query), it still requires about 1–3 more hops to reach
the same success rate as the centrality techniques, thus imposing higher overhead in the
system.
Lesson 2: Search techniques that use social graph (user) or projection graph (peer) cen-
tralities perform similarly. This means that an application could select which of the cen-
131
trality techniques to use based on the available centrality information for each user or
peer. If it cannot access the individual score of Alice in the social graph or her full data
to calculate it (e.g., due to privacy settings), but can access her peer’s score (an aggregate
metric for a user group), it can achieve the same performance by routing queries through
the social graph edges using the projection graph peer centralities.
Lesson 3: Search techniques that use local or global information perform similarly. Search
techniques that use global centralities calculated over the whole graph (i.e., node and
edge betweenness centrality) perform similarly to the ones calculated using local infor-
mation (i.e., degree centrality). Therefore, an application can utilize the degree centrality
of users or peers to inform the forwarding decision of the search query.
Lesson 4: It is feasible and more efficient to construct PG-based P2P overlays. A P2P
system can leverage a centrality technique that uses local information such as peer degree
centrality to construct the set of active connections EA used by peers during a search.
Furthermore, a small set of active connections EPiA per peer is enough to ensure high
performance and low communication overhead.
This fraction of edges would mean for the most connected peer of gnutella31 and slashdot
a maximum of 80 and 392 active connections respectively, which is well below the maxi-
mum connections of deployed unstructured overlays (Gnutella V0.6 had peers with more
than 500 connections [RSR06]).
Lesson 5: Traversing the projection graph could bring significant improvements in search
and reduced overhead. In comparison to traversing the social graph edges, leveraging the
projection graph topology provides access to social information of more users and thus,
on average, increases the success rate by 10%–25%, reduces the walk length by 1–2 hops
and decreases the percentage of peers accessed by 40% for the person-finder search and
by 2.5% for the team-builder search. Thus, socially-aware applications and services could
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be developed to take full advantage of the available information for enhanced application
search and overlay performance.
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Chapter 9: Related Work
In this chapter we present a literature review of previous studies related to this disser-
tation. First we cover studies related to the Prometheus system [KFA+10b, KFA+10a],
and its various design features, and then we cover studies related to the projection graph
topologies [KI11] and peer centrality in such graphs.
9.1 Socially-Aware Applications and Services
Socially-aware applications and services have so far leveraged out-of-band social rela-
tionships for objectives such as recommending email recipients or filtering spam based
on previous email activity [KRS+06], filtering restaurant recommendations based on re-
views by friends (e.g., Yelp [Yel12]), improving security [YKGF06, YGKX08], inferring
trust [MRG+05], providing incentives for resource sharing [TCL08, LD06], or building
overlays [PCT04] for private communication.
Leveraging online social information has been used to rank Internet search results rel-
ative to the interests of a user’s neighborhood in the social network [GMD06], to favor
socially-connected users in a BitTorrent swarm [PGW+08], and to reduce unwanted com-
munication [MPDG08]. Social information has also been leveraged in conjunction with
location and collocation data to provide novel mobile applications such as Loopt [Loo12],
Foursquare [Fou12] and Google’s Latitude [Goo12a].
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In all of these cases, social knowledge has been mined in the context of a single appli-
cation or from a single source of information. Our approach on the Prometheus system
differs from these studies in four important ways.
First, we collect information from multiple sources. Two systems that aggregate social
information from multiple sources are Sonar [GJS+08] and SocialFusion [BGX+10]. Un-
like our approach, Sonar is limited to improving information flow in an organization
by aggregating social network information within the enterprise context, from sources
such as email, instant messaging, etc. Similar to our approach, SocialFusion proposes an
integration of diverse mobile, social and sensor input streams, but focuses on the class
of context-aware social applications, whereas our work enables a larger variety of social
applications.
Second, we extract knowledge from the social graph by accessing larger portions of the
network, not only a user’s direct neighborhood. Somewhat similarly, RE [GKF+06] uses
2–hop relationships to automatically populate email whitelists.
Third, in Prometheus, social information can cross application boundary contexts, similar
to Ramachandran and Feamster’s proposal to “export” the social ties formed in social
networks for authentication in off-social applications [RF08].
And finally, our social graph representation offers richer information for fine-grained eval-
uation of social ties. Kahanda and Neville also represent interactions with a weighted,
directed multi-edged graph [KN09]. Prometheus differs in its generality of the graph—its
edges can represent interactions collected from different sources.
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9.2 Social Data Management
There have been various system architectures proposed in the past for managing social
information of users. Centralized architectures have been primarily used from compa-
nies operating online social networks for regular users (e.g., Facebook, Google, Twit-
ter [Twi12a], etc), academics and researchers (e.g., Academia.edu [Aca12]), professionals
(e.g., LinkedIn [Lin12]), etc. Our literature review focuses on distributed architectures
including mobile systems and peer-to-peer networks.
9.2.1 Mobile Systems for Social Data Management
System architectures to store and manage social information over mobile devices have
been proposed in systems such as [MMC09, POL+09, SRA10, TPI11].
In [MMC09] a middleware service is described for social networking via mobile devices.
Devices are logically divided to clients, i.e., nodes with social-based information regarding
their owners’ preferences and who request recommendations from brokers, i.e., nodes who
are responsible for gather social information from multiple clients, propagating social
links and providing recommendations to clients.
Mobiclique [POL+09] is a mobile social networking middleware that allows mobile users
to tap on existing online social networks such as Facebook and extend their interactions
in real life through opportunistic encounters with other users. Mobiclique devices boot-
strap from their owners’ OSN profiles and alert them when they share some pre-defined
relationship like friendship or interests with nearby users.
A distributed tuple space system is presented in [SRA10] that can support services usu-
ally provided by online social networks such as calendars, video and audio communication
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and instant messaging. Data are stored in, or retrieved from the system in the form of
tuples (key/value pairs). In addition it can support these functionalities in oﬄine mode
using multi-hop ad hoc networks.
Yarta [TPI11] is a middleware for supporting mobile social ecosystems, which are sets of
rich interactions between users, over different types of activities, especially when within
physical proximity. It allows exchange of social information between users and applica-
tions and enforces access control to users’ data. It also implements a set of components
for data extraction from social sensors, storage of the data within the users’ devices, and
retrieval from mobile applications, whose code can be generated using automatic tools.
All these approaches explore the possibility of storing and sharing user social informa-
tion on systems of mobile devices. However, even though much of the social information
is nowadays generated by mobile devices, they are inherently unsuitable for running a
complex social service such as Prometheus due to resource constraints: the mobile devices
may not be always online or synchronized to support up-to-date inferences; and compu-
tational resources, and more importantly energy, are likely to be scarce, as pointed out
by many of the above studies. Also, mobile phones might not be allowed to store social
information of users other than their owner, thus incurring excessive network overhead to
fulfill a multi-hop query in the social graph.
9.2.2 Peer-to-Peer Systems for Social Data Management
In [BD09] and [DBV+10] a set of research challenges are identified when decentralizing
core functionalities of social networks and how a peer-to-peer infrastructure can be used
to realize a decentralized online social network. Security, user control of data, storage,
topology, search, and update management are some of the topics discussed within this
realization.
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Prometheus leverages a P2P architecture within the social hourglass infrastructure [IBK12]
to provide user-controlled social data management and social inferences for services and
applications. P2P management of social information has also been addressed in systems
such as PeerSoN [BSVD09], Vis-a`-Vis [SLCC08, SVCC09, SLC+11], Safebook [CMS09,
CMS10], LotusNet [AR12] and LifeSocial.KOM [GGS+11].
PeerSoN [BSVD09] is a two-tier system architecture: the first tier is used to lookup for
metadata of users, current location/IP, notifications, etc; the second tier is used for the
actual contact between peers and users and the exchange of data (files, profiles, chat,
etc). The lookup service is implemented with a DHT. The second tier is allows for op-
portunistic and delay-tolerant networking. Users can exchange data either through the
DHT storage or directly between their devices. Prometheus differs from this approach in
two significant ways: first, by enabling users to select trusted peers which are independent
from the users’ devices, to store and exchange social data, and second, by providing social
inference functionalities to applications and services.
Safebook [CMS09, CMS10] is a decentralized OSN that aims to solve privacy issues in
current centralized OSNs by using a 3-component architecture: a trusted identification
service to provide each peer and user unambiguous identifiers, a P2P substrate for lookup
of data, and matryoshkas, concentric rings of peers around each member’s peer that pro-
vide trusted data storage, profile data retrieval and obscure communication through in-
direction. Profiles of users in Safebook are replicated in the innermost layer of a user’s
matryoshka to increase availability of the data. Similarly, Prometheus users employ mul-
tiple trusted peers. Also, Prometheus similarly forwards messages between peers based
on social relations and inference requests, while restricting a large scale view of the graph
through P2P decentralization. Prometheus differs dramatically, however, in the exposure
of the graph as a first class data object through inference functionality.
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In [SLCC08, SVCC09], three schemes for decentralized OSNs were presented, where users
store their personal data in their own machines or Virtual Individual Servers (VISs). The
VISs use peer-to-peer overlay networks, one per social group, to allow their owners to
share information with other users. The first scheme deploys the VISs on a virtualized
utility computing infrastructure in the cloud, the second scheme on desktop machines
augmented with socially-informed data replication, and the third again on desktop ma-
chines with standby virtual machines in the cloud when the primary VIS of a user be-
comes unavailable. In later work [SLC+11] the authors focused on providing location-
based networking services using a cloud infrastructure than a P2P network, since trust
of the compute utilities is warranted given the companies’ business models and terms of
use with their clients. While similar to the trusted peer concept in Prometheus, VISs are
hosted by a centralized cloud computing provider to tackle peer churn, while Prometheus
provides a truly decentralized infrastructure—making use of social incentives to reduce
churn on user-supplied peers.
LotusNet [AR12] is a DHT-based online social network system that binds user identities
with their overlay nodes and published resources for increased security. User data such as
social information, content, etc, are stored encrypted on the Likir DHT [AMRS08]. Users
control access to their data by issuing signed grants to other users applied during retrieval
of data. Services such as event notifications, folksonomic content search and reputation
management are demonstrated.
In LifeSocial.KOM [GGS+11], user information is stored in the form of distributed linked
lists in a DHT and is accessible from various plugin-based applications, while enforcing
symmetric PKI to ensure user-controlled privacy and access. However, the data of a user
are isolated from other users and peers access them individually, incurring significant
system overhead.
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Generally, in all these studies (PeerSoN, Safebook, LotusNet, LifeSocial.KOM), the social
graph is fragmented into 1-hop neighborhoods, one for each user, and distributed across
all peers, with potentially multiple fragments stored on the same peer that cannot be
combined. Also, there is no peer functionality that utilizes the combination of the acces-
sible units for simple social inference functions such as neighborhood search. In contrast,
in Prometheus, a peer can locally mine the collection of social data entrusted to it by a
group of (possibly socially-connected) users.
Commercial efforts such as [Ent12, Fre12a, Dia12] implement distributed social network-
ing services and allow users to share content in a decentralized fashion. Our work with
the Prometheus service significantly differs from the previously noted approaches (com-
mercial and academic) in that it not only collects and stores user social information from
multiple sources in a P2P network, but also exposes social inference functions useful for
various socially-aware applications. This approach shares ideas with the MobiSoc middle-
ware [GKBB09]; however, the MobiSoc middleware is logically centralized leading to “big
brother” concerns similar to existing OSNs.
9.3 Privacy and Security in Decentralized OSNs
In Safebook [CMS09, CMS10] the concentric matroysha layers of nodes around the data
of each user offer privacy and allow users to control access to their data via three levels:
public, protected or private. However, there is an inherent tradeoff between privacy due
to the number of layers around user data, and data availability and delays for data re-
trieval due to the recursive nature of the Safebook forward protocols. Instead, Prometheus
enables users to select multiple trusted peers to increase data availability and define fine-
grained access control policies applied at each trusted peer to provide specific data to spe-
cific applications or users. Using the ACPs, Prometheus users can also require inference
requests to be initiated or forwarded through particular users and/or peers in the 1-hop
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neighborhood of the user owning the data, therefore enabling stronger data protection
than the matroyshka layers, and without the overhead expected in Safebook [CMS10].
Persona [BBS+09] combines attribute-based encryption with traditional PKI cryptog-
raphy and supports flexible and fine-grained access control for user data. In the future,
Prometheus could leverage this system to provide more flexible access control policies
while preserving inference functionality.
Lockr [TSGW09] is an access control system that can be used either in centralized or
decentralized OSNs, by decoupling the content to be shared between users, from the list
of users participating in the sharing. This is achieved by allowing users-data owners to
distribute signed social attestations of their relationships to their contacts that will want
to access the particular content. Instead, in Prometheus, users that want to allow access
to particular data need to define specific ACPs for that data only once, and their trusted
peers will apply them multiple times thereafter every time there is an incoming inference
request. Similarly to Lockr, the ACPs can include social relationships that data owners
have with the data requesters, which can be either direct or indirect social contacts.
In [UPvS11] the authors provide a detailed review of system-level attacks that a DHT-
based system such as Prometheus could be the target of, and ways to defend against
them. We briefly discuss Sybil attacks [Dou02] which are easy to stage and more effective
in a P2P-based social data management system.
In a Sybil attack, a malicious user introduces to the system multiple nodes he directly
controls, with different identity for each node, so that he can disrupt system protocols
such as routing, storage, etc, by artificially creating majority of colluding nodes in the
P2P system. Prometheus could defend against such attacks by employing Sybil-resistant
DHT solutions such as [DLLKA05] or [LLK10]. Also, defenses using existing security
techniques (e.g., [YKGF06, YGKX08, TLSC11]) can be used to perform decentralized
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Sybil-resilient admission control of new users in the system, or to control formation of
new social edges between users and how their social data are stored on peers.
9.4 Application Programmable Interfaces for Social Information
APIs for accessing social information have been offered by several OSN companies. Face-
book allows 3rd-party application developers and websites to access the social information
of millions of users through the Open Graph API [Fac12a].
Similarly, OpenSocial [Goo12b] is a public specification used by many OSNs. It defines
a component hosting environment (container) and a set of common APIs for web-based
applications to access social information stored on any of the supported social networks:
Hi5 [Hi512], MySpace [MyS12], Orkut [Ork12], Friendster [Fri12], Yahoo! [Yah12], etc.
Twitter offers two APIs. The Rest API [Twi12b] offers information about users and their
tweets, messages between users, friends and followers of users, favorites tweets, geo-related
information, arising trends, etc. The Streaming API [Twi12c] offers near-realtime access
to various topics of tweets as being produced by users and websites.
It has been shown that social networks constructed from online gaming activities be-
tween players can exhibit social properties (e.g., Pardus [ST10] and Steam [BSL+11a,
BSL+11b, BSK+12]) and therefore collecting and analyzing social information from such
networks can be of importance to application developers. Valve, a company that creates
and distributes online games to millions of players, provides a web API [Ste12] enabling
developers to access gaming and social data from profiles of gamers interacting within
Steam (its in-house online gaming social network) and its supported online games.
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Such APIs do not provide direct complex inferences such as “friends of friends” or “social-
strength” as Prometheus does, but instead an application must explicitly crawl the graph
and infer such information.
9.5 Projection Graphs in Existing Peer-to-Peer Systems
In the previously mentioned P2P systems (PeerSoN [BSVD09], Safebook [CMS10], Vis-
a`-Vis [SLCC08, SVCC09, SLC+11], LotusNet [AR12] and LifeSocial.KOM [GGS+11]) as
well as Prometheus, the decentralization of the social graph of users onto multiple peers
leads to the emergence of a projection graph between peers, as proposed in this work,
regardless of the way peers are organized in the P2P architecture (e.g., in a structured
or unstructured overlay).
In such systems, a peer can calculate the cumulative centrality score of users in the so-
cial graph mapped on the peer, and infer the peer position and thus importance in the
socially-informed topology. Therefore, the projection graph model can be applied for
studying and improving the performance of a socially-informed application using the
social graph distributed in such systems.
There are other systems that utilize the projection graph topology by directly reflecting
the social graph topology in the P2P overlay organization. Turtle [PCT04] uses trust
relationships between users to build overlays for private communication and preserve the
anonymity of its users. F2F [LD06] uses social incentives to find reliable storage nodes in
a P2P storage system. Sprout [MGGM04] enhances the routing tables of a Chord DHT
with additional trusted social links of online friends, to improve query results and reduce
delays. Tribler [PGW+08] allows users that are socially connected and participate in the
same BitTorrent swarms to favor each other in content discovery, recommendation and
downloading of files.
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In other studies such as [YZLT09], peers are organized into social P2P networks based on
similar preferences, interests or knowledge of their users, to improve search by utilizing
peers trusted or relevant to the search. Similarly, in [LCTC07] a social-based overlay for
unstructured P2P networks is outlined, that enables peers to find and establish ties with
other peers if their owners have common interest in specific types of content, thus improv-
ing search and reducing overlay construction overhead. In [WS08], P2P social networks
self-organize based on the concept of distributed neuron-like agents and search stimulus
between peers, to facilitate improved resource sharing and search. In such systems, the
peers form edges over similar preferences of their owners or search requests, reflecting
the P2P edges in the projection graph model. Thus, they implicitly use this model to
organize the peers into P2P social networks.
9.6 Peer Centrality
Relevant to our work on the centrality of peers in the projection graph, is the notion of
the group reduced graph, as sketched in [EB99], where groups of users are replaced by a
single “super” vertex whose neighborhood is the union of the neighborhoods of all group
members. This technique allows for easier construction of group centrality measures, but
a basic challenge, as stated in [EB99], is to justify the removal of internal social links in a
group. However, in our instance of the reduced model, this is not a problem: members of
a group can store their data on the same peer which has complete knowledge of the social
subgraph formed by the union of individual users’ social data.
Studies such as [EB99] and [KCB09] analytically discuss the betweenness centrality of a
group of nodes by computing shortest paths between nodes outside the group, that pass
through at least one node in the group [EB99] or all the nodes in the group [KCB09].
Similarly, we study the betweenness centrality of peers representing groups of users. How-
ever, we assume that all users are mapped on peers (groups) and compute the peer be-
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tweenness centrality based on shortest paths between users mapped on different peers
only.
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Chapter 10: Lessons on Designing Socially-Aware Distributed Systems
Our work on the design and experimental evaluation of Prometheus, as well as our ex-
perimental analysis of projection graphs, enables us to extract several lessons that are
applicable to previous studies on social-based P2P systems and can provide guidelines for
the design of future socially-aware distributed systems and applications.
10.1 Socially-Aware Decentralization of the Social Graph
Enabling users to select where to store their social information can lead to a socially-
aware distribution of users’ data in the system. Therefore, groups of socially-connected
users could store their data on the same peers, and this could lead to significant system
improvements:
• Reduce end-to-end response time for applications mining the social graph.
• Reduce message overhead between peers during inference execution and social
graph traversal.
• Increase success rate in social graph search.
• Reduce the average opportunity of peers to influence inference requests exe-
cuted in the system, and thus their ability to manipulate requests.
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These improvements allow the system to fulfill faster any application inference requests
and increase resilience to attacks, either staged by independent peers or by colluding
peers.
10.2 Peer Organization and Centrality Estimation
We have shown that a projection graph with social properties can emerge in a system
that distributes the data of users in a socially-aware manner (e.g., groups of socially-
connected users, or communities of users, store their data on the same peer). In our pro-
jection graph experiments, increasing the average community size from 5 to 1000 users
per peer inevitably decreased the number of peers in the system (from thousands to tens).
This parameter allowed us to study how the degree of social data decentralization affects
the network properties, and in particular the centrality of the nodes in the system.
Socially meaningful communities of 50–150 users lead to optimal peer organization in
terms of degree and node betweenness centrality.
Our study of projection graphs led, via a different methodology, to a previous result known
as the Dunbar number. Dunbar [Dun98] predicted that on average individuals can man-
age a meaningful social circle of about 150 friends, no matter how sociable they are. Also,
people tend to self-organize in groups of around 150; above this number, social cohesion
begins to deteriorate as groups become larger. In [LLDM08] the best communities with
respect to conductance were found to be relatively small with sizes only up to about 100
users, thus agreeing with Dunbar’s number. Above this size, the quality of communities is
questionable as they start blending more with the core of the graph.
We found that, for a particular range of the average number of users per peer, the pro-
jection graphs follow closely the properties of the social graph distributed on the P2P
network. Independently of the network tested, within a range of about 50–150 users per
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community, the organization of the projection graph topology reaches an optimal point
with respect to average degree or node betweenness centrality. This range agrees with
Dunbar’s number and leads us to believe that there is a high correlation between the way
people organize within the social graph into social groups or communities and how the
properties of such social organization can be embedded in the emerging projection graph
topology.
Smaller social communities can allow better estimation of peer centrality which can be
used to improve application and system performance.
Large-scale systems such as mobile phone or P2P networks decentralize the users’ social
data on thousands of nodes and allow each device to access social data of a small set of
users. The smaller this set, the higher the association is between the users’ centrality in
the social graph with their device’s centrality in the projection graph. Therefore, the pro-
jection graph inherits social properties from the social graph stored in the system. Since
peer centrality in the projection graph can be estimated using the cumulative centrality
scores of its users in the social graph, an application can use either centrality score (user
or peer) to effectively route search queries.
Furthermore, an application or system overlay can identify with high accuracy the peers
with top degree or betweenness centrality, by knowing the top-5% degree or betweenness
centrality users in the social graph. Since peer centrality can be used to improve appli-
cation and system performance (Chapter 8), peers could enforce upper bounds on the
amount of user data to store (e.g., up to 100 users), to maintain high correlation between
their centrality and the users’ centrality.
However, storing more user data per peer decreases end-to-end response time for an ap-
plication traversing the social graph. In fact, considering centralized company systems
with a few hundred machines, each node can access social data of thousands of users. By
distributing the social data on centralized machines in a socially-aware manner (e.g., as
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in [PES+10]), our experiments revealed that the degree and node betweenness centrality
of peers should be similar, not highly correlated with the users’ centrality, and that all
peers should have an equal opportunity to be queried for social data. Thus, there are no
real benefits in using the centrality of peers in such centralized setups.
Therefore, trade-offs must be considered between performance improvements and the
ability to use peer centrality in application or system design when decentralizing user
social data on multiple machines and with a variable community size.
10.3 Leveraging Peer Centrality in the Application Design
Central peers can be used for performance improvements in social search.
Search techniques that use social or projection graph centralities perform similarly, and
always with higher success rates within fewer hops (in social or projection graph) than
random-based search techniques. Furthermore, using degree centrality (local information)
has the same benefits for a search technique as using node betweenness centrality (global
information).
Therefore, if an application was not granted access to the individual centrality scores of
users in the social graph, e.g., due to user privacy settings, but only to the peer scores
in the projection graph, it can still route search queries through the social or projection
graph, using the peer degree centralities. These results are applicable to previous works
such as [GMD06, YZLT09, LCTC07], where social search can be informed using an esti-
mation of the peer degree centrality in the projection graph.
High betweenness peers can be used for application monitoring and trace collection.
These peers are situated on many shortest paths between other peers (and their users)
and a high portion of the workload from social applications will pass through them. There-
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fore, social applications can collect usage statistics or better provision resources on these
peers for improved performance. This can be applied in systems that manage social infor-
mation of users and can expose it to user applications and services (e.g., Prometheus).
Central P2P edges can be used for data caching and dissemination.
P2P applications can make use of high betweenness edges to 1) monitor information flow
between different parts of the network, 2) place caches of data on the edges’ end peers
for faster dissemination and 3) create caches of search results and indexes of data loca-
tion for speedup of access and search. This result could be used by systems such as Tri-
bler [PGW+08] to advance its mechanisms for caching metadata of user activity, content
location and data placement for downloads between several communities of users.
10.4 Leveraging Peer Centrality in the System Design
Central peers and P2P edges can be used to construct trusted, search-efficient and socially-
aware P2P overlays.
There are benefits in building an unstructured P2P overlay by leveraging the projection
graph topology and selecting P2P overlay links using centrality metrics. Our experiments
on social search showed that overlay communication overhead can be reduced if peers
construct their routing tables using projection graph edges to neighboring central peers.
However, such P2P network paths can be used frequently from any type of application
traversing the social graph and not only from social search. Thus, these paths should be
explicitly defined and used in the construction of the P2P overlay.
This idea could be embedded in P2P systems such as Prometheus, Turtle [PCT04] and
Sprout [MGGM04], that already implement a socially-informed design, but instead of
using single social edges between users, they could exploit high weight projection graph
150
edges which represent multiple social edges between groups of users, and indicate stronger
social bonds and potential trust between users and their peers. Therefore, these peer
paths can be assumed more trusted and lead to more secure discovery of new peers for
data hosting, within reduced network hops.
Peers can employ methods for bundling data shared with other peers over these paths,
thus reducing network communication. Moreover, such projection graph edges could rep-
resent social incentives between multiple users for data sharing among neighboring com-
munities and their peers. Consequently, potential increase of the communication between
these peers when serving application workload, or for system maintenance due to peer
churn, can be tackled with data replication to neighboring peers in the projection graph,
for better data availability and load distribution.
Central peers’ data can be mirrored on other peers to avoid overloading and unavailability
due to peer churn.
The performance of a P2P application is inherently depended on its tolerance to churn.
In the presence of high peer churn, users could change their storage peers for better data
availability. Since social networks are less dynamic than P2P networks, the user social
connections are typically stable. Thus, peers can estimate accurately their importance
(via centrality) in the topology, based only on locally stored information, i.e., the cen-
trality of their users, which, given the slow dynamic of social networks, can be computed
infrequently.
Central users are connected to each other more directly than average [SBAG08], which
means they are more likely to be part of the same community. Consequently, they could
be mapped on the same peer, as a direct consequence of the socially-aware distribution
of the social graph on peers. This, in effect, increases significantly the peer’s centrality
leading to the formation of “hot-spot” peers.
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The system could infer where these hot-spot peers will appear just based on the centrality
metrics of the users mapped on those peers, with no need to analyze the dynamic P2P
overlay or the projection graph. Identifying such hot-spot peers can be used for monitor-
ing much of the socially-routed peer-to-peer traffic; for placing caches or replicas; and for
avoiding bottlenecks by remapping high betweenness users onto better provisioned peers.
Central peers can be used to tackle system’s vulnerability to attacks.
These high centrality peers control much of the information flowing through the P2P
topology and could, on one hand, be more vulnerable, and on the other hand, more effec-
tive if they participate in a malicious attack. Such peers can be targeted for quarantine in
the early stages of a malware outburst or used to disseminate faster and more efficiently
security software patches and emergency announcements.
Predicting social edge formation can improve data access latency via proactive caching.
Using intuition from sociological studies, systems such as Prometheus could predict the
creation of social edges between users, by monitoring the triadic closures between them
and identifying which ones violate the forbidden triad rule [Gra73]. This rule refers to the
situation where two individuals, not socially connected with each other but with a strong
social connection with another mutual individual, will likely form a social connection
with each other in the future. This observation could enable the system to anticipate
access of the particular users’ social data, and thus perform proactive caching on central
or neighboring peers.
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Chapter 11: Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation presented Prometheus, a P2P service that provides decentralized, user-
controlled, social data management. Its directed, weighted, labeled and multi-edged so-
cial graph offers a fine-grained representation of the users’ social state. It enables novel
socially-aware applications to mine this rich social graph via non-trivial social inference
functions, while enforcing user-defined access control policies.
We built and evaluated Prometheus using a large-scale distributed testbed and realistic
workloads. Prometheus is designed as an application-oriented platform. Thus, we tested
its end-to-end performance and showed that real-time deadlines set by application re-
quests can be met without significant reduction in the quality of results. Additionally,
we implemented a proof-of-concept mobile social application that utilizes Prometheus
functionalities under real-time deadlines.
We investigated the vulnerability of Prometheus to attacks and established that the dis-
tributed, directed, labeled and weighted social multi-graph maintained by this service,
in most cases, can successfully mitigate attacks. Also, Prometheus’ socially-aware design
reduces the opportunity of malicious peers to influence the inference request execution.
We have also proposed the projection graph, a model for studying the network proper-
ties of a P2P system such as Prometheus, that hosts the social graph of its users in a
distributed fashion. We represented analytically the degree, node and edge betweenness
centrality for the social and projection graph and discussed the relation between the two
types of graphs in terms of these centrality measures. Because the analytical expressions
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are heavily dependent on the topology of these graphs and how they are decentralized
in the P2P system, we studied experimentally the correlation between their centrality
metrics over a wide range of configurations.
Our experiments showed that within a range of 50–150 users mapped on a peer, there
is an optimal organization of the projection graph, since peers score the highest average
degree and node betweenness centrality. Also, up to this point, there is a high correlation
between the properties of users and their peers, which degrades rapidly when the number
of users per peer passes this optimal organization threshold. This correlation allows us to
estimate with high accuracy the centrality of peers based on the centrality scores of users
and their edges.
In addition, we investigated experimentally how peer centrality metrics can be used for
the social graph traversal of search applications. We have shown that targeting top ranked
degree or betweenness peers in the projection graph or top ranked degree on betweenness
users in the social graph can achieve equal improvements in the performance of a social
search. This is true when the search is executed either at the application or overlay layer.
The performance of Prometheus can certainly be optimized using our theoretical work
on projection graphs, and applying several of the lessons described above on designing
socially-aware distributed infrastructures.
First, benefiting from the slow changes that occur in social graphs, we plan to cache and
pre-compute results of inferences and perform replication to nearby or central peers as
proposed above to deal with peer churn or overloaded peers. Since trusted peers period-
ically check for new records in the social data files of their users, they can update their
local copies and rerun the inferences to ensure consistency of these results.
Another way to improve application response time is to perform the following greedy op-
timization with respect to the parallel inference execution process. A peer that needs to
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send secondary requests to other peers for the next hop of a multi-hop inference request
could calculate the minimum set of secondary peers needed to cover all users for the next
hop. This optimization could decrease request delays by reducing the number of peers to
be contacted at each hop and thus the variability of request execution. This min-set can
be further optimized using the network-wise closest peers of the transmitting peer. This
greedy algorithm would not be the optimal one which takes into account global knowl-
edge of how users’ data are distributed on the subsequent hops (not just the next hop).
Therefore, further theoretical and experimental work is needed to calculate how close to
the optimal this greedy algorithm can perform, as well as the performance improvements
when applied to a real distributed system such as Prometheus.
Furthermore, we can consider that in reality, the social graph is decentralized on peers
not only in a socially-aware manner but also in a geographic manner. Therefore, we plan
to experimentally examine the improvements of application performance for inference
requests under this more realistic distribution of user data on geographically-close peers.
We also plan to expand the set of social inferences to utilize the location and collocation
of users.
Additionally, we consider Prometheus providing activity ontologies to social sensors and
personal aggregators to support label consistency across multiple sensors and allow differ-
ent sensors to provide input for the same labels. Finally, while our default ACPs prevent
any single user from gaining knowledge of the entire graph, we intent to ascertain what
level of collusion between users could expose the entire graph.
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Appendix A: List of Acronyms
P2P Peer-to-Peer
PL PlanetLab
SG Social Graph
PG Projection Graph
OSN Online Social Network
SKS Social Knowledge Service
TF2 Team Fortress 2
DHT Distributed Hash Table
TPL Trusted Peer List
RTT Round Trip Time
SNA Social Network Analysis
DC Degree Centrality
NBC Node Betweenness Centrality
EBC Edge Betweenness Centrality
CDCU Degree Centrality of Users
CNBCU Cumulative Node Betweenness Centrality of Users
CEBCU Cumulative Edge Betweenness Centrality of Users
DCP Degree Centrality of Peers
NBCP Node Betweenness Centrality of Peers
EBCP Edge Betweenness Centrality of Peers
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ACM Association of Computing Machinery
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Appendix B: Pseudocode for Generation of Synthetic Networks
Here we present the pseudocode of the algorithm used for the generation of synthetic
social networks (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) based on the model introduced in [Va´z03] and
refined in [SCW+10].
Input : The probability u (= 0.8 [SCW+10]) of attachment with an existent node, the number of pairs κ
(= 1) of existing nodes to be connected, and the desired size N of the Synthetic Social Network.
Output : A graph G = (V,E) which is a Synthetic Network with Social Network Power-Law properties.
begin
Let G = (V,E) be a graph with a single node x ∈ V ;
while |V | ≤ N do
u′ ← a real chosen uniformly at random from [0, 1];
if u′ ≤ 1− u then
z ← a node chosen uniformly at random from V ;
Let y be a new node;
V ← V ∪ {y};
E ← E ∪ {(y, z)};
for i = 1 to κ do
Let E′ be the set of potential edges, i.e., the set of all pairs (a, b) such that (a, b) /∈ E;
(a, b)← an edge chosen uniformly at random from E′;
E ← E ∪ {(a, b)};
end
end
else
Let E′ be the set of potential edges, i.e., the set of all pairs (a, b) such that (a, b) /∈ E;
(a, b)← an edge chosen uniformly at random from E′;
E ← E ∪ {(a, b)};
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for the generation of synthetic social networks following the
algorithm from [SCW+10].
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Appendix C: Reuse of Material from Copyrighted Sources
Figure C.1 shows the permission to reuse material from the paper [KFA+10a] in Chap-
ter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Figure C.1: Permission for reusing material from 11th ACM/IFIP/USENIX International
Conference on Middleware, November-December 2010.
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Appendix C: (continued)
Figure C.2 shows the approval to reuse material from the paper [IBK12] in Chapter 2 of
this dissertation.
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Figure C.2: Approval for reusing material from IEEE Internet Computing Magazine,
May-June 2012.
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Appendix C: (continued)
Figure C.3 shows the approval to reuse material from the paper [KI11] in Chapter 5,
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation.
Figure C.3: Approval for reusing material from 11th IEEE International Conference on
Peer-to-Peer Computing, August-September 2011.
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